Reforming local governance: fiscal federalism and political accountability by Alvarez, Ana Catarina Silva Dias
Nova School of Business and Economics
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Reforming Local Governance:
Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Ana Catarina Silva Dias Alvarez, Student Number 14336
A dissertation carried out on the PhD in Economics, under the supervision of
Professor Susana Peralta.
November 8, 2019
c©2019, by Catarina Alvarez. All rights reserved.
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Abstract
This thesis explores three reforms implemented in Portugal to obtain causal inference
about the manifold impacts of the rules that shape local government behavior. The first
chapter focuses on the electoral response to a property tax reform, aiming to promote a
higher degree of decentralization and autonomy of municipalities. The second chapter
tests the hypothesis of tax capitalization by exploring an unexpected reduction in the
upper bound of the property tax rate. The last chapter - using an original dataset on
mayors’ characteristics - exploits a recent reform introducing mayoral term limits to
identify its causal impact on political selection.
Keywords: public finance, fiscal federalism, property taxation, political account-
ability.
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Introduction
The last decades witnessed an unprecedented move towards more decentralized spend-
ing and taxing powers. While there is extensive literature, dating to Tiebout (1956) and
Oates (1972) seminal contributions about the merits of decentralization, less is known
about how specific details about its design have an impact on economic outcomes. The
classical argument in the literature is that decentralization allows for a better represen-
tation of local preferences and so better accountability of local politicians Lockwood
(2006).
On the other hand, there is also a more skeptical strand of the literature. The main
criticism is that decentralization is not equivalent to separation, therefore even when
decisions on critical public services are delegated to local governments, the financing re-
sponsibility often largely remains in the hands of the central government (Ambrosanio
and Bordignon, 2006, Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault, 1998). Consequently, in-
stead of strengthening, decentralization may weaken political accountability, leading to
less efficient equilibria (Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah, 2007). The intuition is that if
citizens are uncertain about whom to blame for the taxes they have to pay, they will be
less able to punish or reward the right politicians for their behavior. Hence, this leads
to more tolerance in judging fiscal decisions.
Recently, there have been several contributions that exploit quasi-experimental vari-
ation in institutional design at the local level to obtain causal inference about the man-
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ifold impacts of the rules that shape local government behavior. This thesis contributes
to this strand of the literature by exploring three reforms implemented in Portugal and
its impacts.
In Portugal, there are three levels of governance: central, municipal, and civil
parishes. There are in total 308 municipalities, from which 278 mainland municipalities.
Portuguese municipalities have control over their spending - subject to prevailing laws
and regulations - but they do not score very high in terms of local revenue autonomy
(OECD, 1999). The reason for the reduced local autonomy is twofold: high reliance on
transfers from the central government and reduced freedom to set local tax rates (on
centrally set tax bases). Local revenue sources consist mainly of local taxes, transfers
from the central and regional governments, and transfers from the EU. There are dif-
ferent local taxes, namely an indirect tax on the transfer of the real estate, the local
property tax, a variable tax share of the central government personal income tax, and
a municipal surcharge on corporate income tax.
The property tax is the main fiscal tool of Portuguese local governments: it is their
primary source of own revenue and over which they have some discretionary power over
the property tax rate. Every year, property tax rates are decided at the municipal
assembly - within an interval typical to every municipality and defined by the central
Government.
From 1926 to 1974, Portugal was governed by an authoritarian regime. In 1974,
democracy was restored, and regular elections have been held: presidential elections
every five years, and parliamentary and local elections every four years. At the munici-
pal level, voters decide their representatives in the municipal council (executive branch)
and the municipal assembly (legislative branch). The head candidate of the most voted
list to the municipal council is elected as mayor, the local top chief executive - the most
prestigious and influential political position at the local level.
Catarina Alvarez 2
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Until 2013, Portuguese local politicians did not face term limits. This means that
they could run indefinitely for office, which happened in fact and with a high success.
For example, in 2009, two politicians were re-elected for their tenth term, meaning that
they have been kept in office since the first local elections held in 1976. However, in
2006, a law introducing mayoral term limits entered into force, but it was only binding
in 2013.
The first chapter focuses on the electoral response to an important tax reform oc-
curred in Portugal, aiming to promote a higher degree of decentralization and increased
the autonomy of local governments. This reform introduced a new property tax (IMI ),
substituting the property tax in place (CA) and introducing a new tax code with a dif-
ferent method for calculating the tax base based on the properties assessed value. This
would imply a significant increase in the tax base of the property tax, whose revenues
are used and managed by the local governments. The central government was respon-
sible for the execution of the reassessments, but it had not conducted a simultaneous
wave of property revaluations after the reform. In fact, after 2003, a transitory regime
was in place, where two tax rates were being applied: the old tax rate if the property
was not reassessed, and the new one if the property was reassessed or bought/sold. By
law, this transitory regime should have lasted at most ten years, so that by 2013, all
properties were already reassessed according to the new code. However, when Portugal
entered the financial assistance program in 2011, it was revealed that approximately
70% of the housing stock was not yet reassessed and, so, one condition of this program
established that the reassessment process must be completed by the end of 2012. This
put in place an urgent wave of property reassessment in all municipalities, extremely
salient and with significant media coverage, for it would imply a shock in tax liabilities.
Whether voters reacted to the impact of the property reassessments at the parlia-
mentary elections of 2015 and how they voted poses critical empirical questions. On
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the one hand, the reform represented a significant increase in property tax liabilities.
On the other hand, given the political unpopularity and people’s adverse reaction to
the reform, the Government decided to implement a tax cap policy until 2014 - which
smoothed out payment of the increase in tax burden due to the reassessments over the
pre-election period - reducing the salience of the shock significantly. Hence, the first
empirical prediction is that there should not be a significant overall response at the
subsequent parliamentary elections. Inspired by Casaburi and Troiano (2016), I test
this prediction estimating a continuous difference-in-differences model based on the in-
tensity of the property reassessments - i.e., the municipal share of urban properties
non-reassessed in 2011. It focuses on six electoral outcome variables: vote share of
the incumbent government party in 2011 (right-wing coalition); vote share of the main
opposition party (socialists); difference in vote share between these two parties; sum in
the vote share of left-wing parties; sum in the vote share of parties with no parliamen-
tary representation; and the sum of blank and null votes (percentage). I obtain a not
statistically significant impact in any of the outcomes, corroborating the first empirical
hypothesis.
Furthermore, the reform is not likely to affect the entire population in an even
manner. By exploiting the growth rate of the property tax base, it is possible to isolate
the de facto effect of the reassessments on the increase of the tax liabilities. This growth
rate presents relevant heterogeneities across municipalities, which might impact how
voters react to the shock. Thus, another empirical prediction is that voting patterns
might differ between municipalities with different real effects of property reassessments.
I implement then a triple difference approach exploiting these heterogeneities, and I
obtain that in municipalities with a higher property tax base growth rate punish more
the incumbent government party at the time of the reform, the right-wing coalition.
The second chapter tests the hypothesis of property tax capitalization by exploring
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an unexpected reduction in the upper bound of the Portuguese property tax rate for
urban real estate in 2008.1 From a theoretical point of view, the property tax capital-
ization is based on the assumption that both house characteristics and factors affecting
the cost of living determine the net present value a prospective buyer is willing to pay
for a house [Oates (1969) and Yinger (1982)]. Therefore, if a property tax reduction
is viewed by the buyers as a decrease in the cost of living, they will be willing to pay
higher prices. Taking the supply of land and housing as fixed, lower present, and future
tax payments are then expected to inflate the market value of the real estate. Empir-
ically, there are two main identification issues that must be taken into account. First,
the level of public goods is positively correlated with the property tax level, and both
independently affect house prices. For this reason, it is difficult to isolate the effect
of the tax separately. Second, there is a likely simultaneity bias between the property
tax rate and house prices when local governments set their own tax rate: areas with a
high house price level, all else equal, are able to set a lower tax rate to collect a certain
amount of tax revenues.
This chapter tackles these issues by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment: an unex-
pected reduction in the upper bound of the Portuguese property tax rate for urban real
estate announced by the Prime-Minister on July 2, 2008. This reform allows dividing
mainland municipalities in treated (those that were forced to decrease their tax rate)
and comparison municipalities. Under the assumption of parallel trends in housing
transaction developments of the two groups, the difference-in-differences setting esti-
mates the causal effect of this reform on real estate values. In Portugal, the property
tax is set by the municipality, on a tax range defined by the central Government. The
value of the tax base (i.e., the fiscal value of the property) is also decided centrally. We
take advantage of a comprehensive dataset based on a single country where all local
1This Chapter is co-authored with Joa˜o Pereira dos Santos
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governments operate under the same institutional framework. This dataset includes
socio-economic, fiscal, and political variables on all mainland Portuguese municipalities
from 2005 to 2011.
It is found that affected municipalities observed an increase in the mean transac-
tion value of urban real estate vis-a`-vis the comparison group. Thus, supporting the
hypothesis of property tax capitalization. In other words, our findings suggest that
buyers take into consideration the lower costs of owning the house, which is reflected in
a market price increase with the net present value of the tax reduction. Throughout the
chapter, we contrast these findings in a sample, including all mainland municipalities
and in a restricted version with more homogenous municipalities. The conclusions are
robust to several specification checks and falsification tests that are performed to dis-
miss selection bias concerns and alternative mechanisms. In particular, it is observed
no significant impact on local expenditures, suggesting that there were no differences
in the public good provision due to the reform allowing us also to rule out the other
critical identification issue mentioned above. Furthermore, the property tax law creates
an interesting natural counter-factual since rural real estate is subject to a different tax
regime that suffered no changes. Unsurprisingly, no effects of the reform are found
on this particular outcome. Furthermore, it is observed no significant impact on local
expenditures, suggesting that there were not potential differences in the public good
provision due to the reform allowing us also to rule out the other critical identification
issue mentioned above.
Finally, the last chapter investigates the selection effects of the introduction of term
limits.2 That is, whether term limits, by creating more rotation in power, lead to
the entry and selection of better politicians. We construct an extensive and unique
dataset on Portuguese mayors’ personal characteristics, and we take advantage of a
2This Chapter is co-authored with Mariana Lopes da Fonseca
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recent reform introducing mayoral term limits in Portugal to identify its causal impact
on political selection.
There is a rich and extensive literature with arguments both for and against the
introduction of term limits, as it eliminates incumbency advantage and removes long-
tenured incumbents from office. Advocates for term limits argue that it allows the entry
of potentially better politicians and eliminates policy biases in favor of specific interest
groups represented by long-serving incumbents. On the other hand, term-limits impose
a constraint on voters’ choice of representatives, whose long tenure may be due to higher
quality; or it may be that voters prefer a representative with more extended political
longevity and stronger influence, who is able to more successfully broker resources and
legislation to their own benefit. By this token, the introduction of term limits poses
a relevant empirical question. For which evidence is still scarce, mainly due to data
limitations (Dal Bo´, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne, 2017).
We study the selection effects of term limits, and our contribution is twofold: we
construct an extensive and unique dataset on Portuguese mayors’ personal character-
istics, and we take advantage of a recent reform introducing mayoral term limits in
Portugal to identify its causal impact on political selection.
Term-limits were introduced in Portuguese local governments in 2006, and the first
effects came into play solely at the 2013 local elections. In total, 150 mayors from the
278 mainland municipalities were forced to leave office, creating the first exogenously
determined open-seat elections in Portugal. We take advantage of this reform as a
quasi-natural experiment to examine its political selection effects. Our identification
strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach estimating how these mayors’
personal characteristics differ on average between municipalities with re-eligible and
term-limited incumbents.
For this purpose, we constructed an extensive and unique dataset on personal char-
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acteristics of Portuguese mayors at the past four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and
2013 - a total of 586 individuals in 278 municipalities. Some of these personal charac-
teristics are publicly available, but self-reported by the elected politicians after taking
office, and the overall data is somewhat incomplete and imprecise. Thus, we comple-
mented it manually using the information found online or contacting the municipal
council directly. Taking all the available information, we compiled the following vari-
ables based on mayors’ characteristics: their gender, the age when they took office for
the first time, the level of education, the area of education, and the occupation before
taking office.
Our baseline results show that municipalities affected by the reform elected politi-
cians, on average, older (around four years) and with a past political career. The
results are robust to several falsification tests, in particular concerning any potential
anticipation effects at the 2009 local election.
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Chapter 1
Electoral Response to a Large
Property Reassessments Reform
1.1 Introduction
Property tax is an extremely important fiscal tool for local governments of most devel-
oped countries (Norregaard, 2013). This is motivated by its immobile tax base and all
of its virtues – low efficiency costs, benign impact on growth and high score on fairness
–, making it fit perfectly the criteria for a good local tax by respecting the benefit
principle and promoting high political accountability. However, in order for property
taxation to reach its potential both in terms of efficiency and equity it requires an ad-
equate management of the property assessment system. That is, the method the tax
authority uses to compute and update the taxable value of properties (i.e., the property
tax base), which is intended to be an approximation of their market value. Continuous
property reassessments are, therefore, crucial to maintain equity by keeping assessed
values in line with their true market value.
Due to the high salience and political unpopularity of the property tax (Cabral
9
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and Hoxby, 2012), motivations behind property reassessments may not be necessarily
related to the maintenance of equity. These hidden motivations make reassessments
more complex than a simple administrative practice and are at the base of the theory
of the creation of a sort of “fiscal illusion” from this procedure.1 This theory is based on
the widespread voter’s perception that politicians set tax rates instead of levies. Since
reassessments are usually translated in an augmented property tax base, this gives
local politicians an opportunity to raise revenues without facing the adverse political
consequences of increasing the tax rate – consequences which are particularly severe
in the case of the property tax. In other words, politicians can take advantage of a
reassessment to meet their budgetary and/or rent-seeking goals without jeopardizing
their reelection chances.
The literature related with the effects of property reassessments is scarce and mostly
focused on its impact on the level of revenues. Bloom and Ladd (1982), Ladd (1991)
and Ross and Yan (2013) documented that indeed property tax revenues tend to spike
up in the year of a community–wide reassessment and attributed this fact to voter
fiscal illusion. On other note, Strumpf (1999) analyzes the distortions of infrequent
assessments.
Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge, no study has yet focused on the electoral
effects of conducting a mass reappraisal. In this paper, I provide a valuable contribution
for the literature by studying the electoral response to an exogenous and urgent wave
of property reassessments in Portugal.
In 2003, an important tax reform occurred in Portugal aiming to promote a higher
degree of decentralization and increased autonomy of local governments. This reform
introduced a new property tax (IMI ), substituting the property tax in place (CA) and
introducing a new tax code with a different method for calculating the tax base based
1Oates (1988) defines fiscal illusion as: “The notion that systematic misperception of key fiscal
parameters may significantly distort fiscal choices by the electorate.”
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on the properties assessed value. Thus, property reassessments had to be conducted
in order to optimally approximate the assessed value to market value. This would
imply a significant increase of the tax base of the property tax, whose revenues are
used and managed by the local governments. The central government was responsible
for the execution of the reassessments but it did not conducted a simultaneous wave
of property revaluations after the reform. In fact, after 2003 transitory regime was in
place, where two tax rates were being applied: the old tax rate if the property was not
reassessed; and the new one if the property was reassessed or bought/sold. By law, this
transitory regime should have lasted at most 10 years, so that by 2013 all properties
were already reassessed according to the new code. However, when Portugal entered
the financial assistance program in 2011, it was revealed that approximately 70% of the
housing stock was not yet reassessed and, so, one condition of this program established
that the reassessment process must be completed by the end of 2012. This put in place
an urgent wave of property reassessment in all municipalities, extremely salient and
with significant media cover, for it would imply a shock in tax liabilities.
Whether voters reacted to the impact of the property reassessments at the parlia-
mentary elections of 2015 and how they voted poses important empirical questions. On
the one hand, the reform represented a significant increase in property tax liabilities.
On the other hand, given the political unpopularity and people’s negative reaction to
the reform, the Government decides to implement a tax cap policy until 2014 - which
smoothed out payment of the increase in tax burden due to the reassessments over the
pre-election period - reducing significantly the salience of the shock. Hence, the first
empirical prediction is that there should not be a significant overall response at the
subsequent parliamentary elections. Inspired by Casaburi and Troiano (2016), I test
this prediction estimating a continuous difference-in-differences model based on the in-
tensity of the property reassessments - i.e., the municipal share of urban properties
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non-reassessed in 2011. It focuses on six electoral outcome variables: vote share of
the incumbent government party in 2011 (right-wing coalition); vote share of the main
opposition party (socialists); difference in vote share between these two parties; sum
in the vote share of left-wing parties; sum in the vote share of parties with no parlia-
mentary representation; and the sum of blank and null votes (percentage). In fact, I
obtain a not statistically significant impact in any of the outcomes, corroborating the
first empirical hypothesis.
Furthermore, the reform is not likely to affect the entire population in an even
manner. By exploring the growth rate of the property tax base it’s possible to isolate
the de facto effect of the reassessments on the increase of the tax liabilities. This growth
rate presents relevant heterogeneities across municipalities, which might impact how
voters react to the shock. Thus, another empirical prediction is that voting patterns
might differ between municipalities with different real effects of property reassessments.
I implement then a triple difference approach exploring these heterogeneities and I
obtain that in municipalities with a higher property tax base growth rate punish more
the incumbent government party at the time of the reform, the right-wing coalition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains in more detail
the Portuguese institutional framework and the tax reform under study. Section 1.3
describes the empirical analysis - the dataset, the treatment and the identification
strategy. Section 1.4 presents the results. In section 1.5, the internal validity of the
results is advocated. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Portuguese Political Overview
From 1926 to 1974, Portugal was governed by an authoritarian regime. In 1974, democ-
racy was restored, and regular elections have been held: presidential elections every 5
years, and parliamentary and local elections every 4 years. Since then, the parliamen-
tary elections have been won either by the center-right party (Partido Social Democrata,
PSD) or by the center-left party (Partido Socialista, PS). However, three other impor-
tant parties are represented in the parliament: the communist party (Partido Comunista
Portugueˆs, PCP)2, a left-wing party (Bloco de Esquerda, BE) and a conservative right-
wing party (Partido Popular, CDS-PP). CDS-PP often forms coalitions with PSD and
has been part of the Portuguese government (1980-83, 2002-05 and 2011-15), however
PSD has kept most of the high level executive branch positions.
1.2.2 Portuguese Property Tax
The current property tax, IMI, was introduced in 2003 as a result of a general reform
of the Portuguese tax system. It substituted the previous property tax, Contribuic¸a˜o
Auta´rquica (CA), implemented in 1989, and was accompanied by a revaluation of urban
property for fiscal purposes, whose implementation spanned several years after the
reform. Therefore, with this reform and until 2013, two different property tax rates co-
exist in each municipality and every year - namely, one on urban property whose fiscal
value was already re-assessed, and another on urban property whose fiscal value was not
yet reassessed according to the new rules. Local authorities have some discretionary
power over the property tax, for every year tax rates are decided at the municipal
assembly. These rates are set within an interval common to every municipality and
2It runs in coalition with the green party PEV which is, in practice, a controlled spin–off.
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defined by the central government. Since 2003, this interval has been experiencing
some changes and Table 1.1 summarizes the evolution of the interval applied to urban
reassessed properties over time.





1.2.3 Property Tax Reform and The Financial Assistance Pro-
gram
In 2003, an important tax reform occurred in Portugal3 aiming to promote a higher
degree of decentralization and increased autonomy of local governments. This reform
introduces a new property tax (Imposto Municipal sobre Bens Imo´veis, IMI ), substi-
tuting the property tax in place (Contribuic¸a˜o Auta´quica, CA) and introducing a new
tax code (CIMI ) with a different method for calculating the tax base based on the
properties assessed value. Thus, property reassessments had to be conducted in order
to optimally approximate the assessed value to market value - i.e., the assessed value
is calculated by implementing a formula set by law and does not depend on the actual
market value of the property. This implied a significant increase of the tax base of the
property tax. These revenues are used and managed by the local governments, whereas
the central government is the one responsible for the execution of the reassessments.
The law established that by 2013 all properties must have been reassessed according
to the new property tax code. However, when Portugal entered the financial assistance
3Decreto-Lei n. 287/2003 - 12/11
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program in May 2011, it was revealed that approximately 70% of the housing stock
was not yet reevaluated. The reason was that no effort by the central government
was done to conduct these reappraisals, probably due to high logistics and political
costs that it would entail. The 30% of the properties reassessed were those transacted
after 2003, whose taxable values were automatically updated according to the new
code. Therefore, one condition of the financial assistance program was in fact that
the reassessment process must be completed by the end of 2012.4. This put in place
an extensive wave of property reassessment in all municipalities, which was extremely
salient at time with significant media cover as it would imply a shock in tax liabilities
- see in Appendix A.1 the headlines of the main Portuguese newspapers in the day the
reappraisal procedure started, December 1st 2011.
This implied that by the end of 2012 all properties were under the new tax code,
thus the property tax bill for this this year would already reflect the augmented tax
base and it would have to be paid in April of 2013. However, this was an electoral year,
with local elections to be held in September of 2013. So given its political unpopularity
and people’s negative reaction, the Government decides to implement a tax cap policy
- “Regime de salvaguarda de pre´dios urbanos”, Article 15-O in Law 60-A/2011 - to
moderate the impact of the general revaluation in the property tax liabilities. This
policy ensures that this increase in tax liabilities shall not exceed, for the year 2012
and 2013 (i.e. to be paid in 2013 and 2014): e75 or one third of the difference between
the tax burden resulting from new tax base and the tax burden in 2011. This way the
payment of tax burden increase was not paid immediately in 2013, but smoothed out
over two years, reducing the salience of the tax reform. It was only in April of 2015
that taxpayers had to pay the full property tax bill corresponding to the new taxable
4“The Government will review the framework for the valuation of the housing stock and land for
tax purposes and present measures to ensure that by end 2012 the taxable value of all property is close
to the market value” in The Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal (2011)
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value of their property. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the property tax liabilities
(in logarithm transformation) over the period 2009 to 2015 and one can observe clearly
the smoothing effect of the tax cap policy.
Figure 1.1: Property Tax Liabilities (log) Evolution: 2009-15
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Treatment Intensity
This process was likely to cause an increase of the property tax liabilities due to this
exogenous shock in the tax base. However, the intensity of this shock depends on the
share of properties to be reassessed, causing a variation in the change of revenues across
municipalities depending on this share. The time-line of this large reassessment reform
and tax cap policy creates an interesting quasi-natural experiment, as it all culminated
before the parliamentary elections of 2015. By exploring the intensity difference of
the reform across municipalities, it is possible to rely on both between- and within-
municipality variation to identify the impact this salient future increase of property tax
liabilities on the electoral outcomes.
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Unfortunately, the share of reassessed/non-reassessed urban properties at municipal
level by the time of the implementation of the reform in 2011 is not available. Hence,
following the rational that until that period only the taxable value of transacted prop-
erties after 2003 was according to the new tax code, I constructed a proxy for this share
based on the housing stock and number of transactions per municipality over the pe-
riod 2003 to 2011. Figure 1.2 shows the spatial distribution of share of non-reassessed
properties in 2011 for all 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities - refer to Appendix
A.2 for more details about the distribution this variable.
Figure 1.2: Property Reassessment Intensity in 2011
This is therefore the main interest variable, providing the property reassessment
intensity across Portuguese municipalities due to the reform.
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1.3.2 Data
This study relies on an extensive dataset at Portuguese municipal level. The empirical
identification is centered on the electoral response to the property reassessment reform
at the central elections of 2009, 2011 and 2015. It focuses on six outcome variables:
vote share of the socialist party; vote share of the right-wing coalition; difference in vote
share between the right-wing coalition and the socialist party; sum in the vote share
of left-wing parties; sum in the vote share of parties with no parliamentary representa-
tion; and the sum of blank plus null votes (percentage). All variables are constructed
using publicly available data from the Portuguese Secretary of Internal Administra-
tion’s website (Secretaria Geral da Administrac¸a˜o Interna, SGMAI ). Panel B of Table
1.2 summarize these variables for the 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities in the
pre-treatment election years, 2009 and 2011.
For robustness, the analysis includes also a number of control variables, namely
socioeconomic and political characteristics. Table 1.2 summarizes these variables for
the pre-treatment period. The socioeconomic variables are described in Panel C and
comprise measures of municipal population size, municipal unemployment, a measure
for municipal economic activity proxied by a purchasing power index and a dummy
indicating whether the municipality is setting the minimum property tax rate. Mu-
nicipal population size coincides with the resident population per municipality series
from Statistics Portugal (INE), and it is also included the share of this population
aged below 15 years old together with share of population aged more the than 65 years
old. Municipal unemployment is measured by the ratio of resident population aged
between 15 and 65 years old who is enrolled as unemployed in Portuguese Institute
of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP). This latter series is obtained from
the Database of Contemporary Portugal (PORDATA). The purchasing power index is
constructed by Statistics Portugal and it is publicly available at their website. Lastly,
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the dummy that turns on when the municipality is setting the minimum property tax
rate is built based on the property tax rate series obtained from the Portuguese Tax
Authority’s website (AT ).
The set of municipality’s political characteristics is described by panel D of Table
1.2 and is constructed based on data obtained from SGMAI, as the outcome variables.
The data is provided at the party level per municipality consisting on the turnout share,
the number of votes and seats allocated to each party. The variable of lagged turnout
consists on the turnout share in the previous central election, i.e. in 2005 and 2009,
respectively. Finally, the other variables are based on incumbent mayor characteristics
in each municipality: a dummy indicating whether she is from the same party as the
central government, the number of terms she has been in office and a dummy indicating
whether she is from a left-wing party.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: 2009 and 2011
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Property Reassessment Variable
Share of Non-Reassessed Properties in 2011 0.671 0.033 0.461 0.702 278
Panel B: Outcome Variables - Vote Shares (%)
Socialist Party 33.437 7.544 9.638 57.830 556
Right-wing Coalition 47.419 14.018 10.672 84.142 556
Right-wing Coalition - Socialists 13.982 19.479 -33.612 74.504 556
Left-wing 48.947 13.766 13.474 86.937 556
No Parliamentary Representation 3.634 1.265 1.174 9.756 556
Blank and Null 3.676 0.956 1.175 6.959 556
Panel C: Socioeconomic Variables
Population (1,000) 36.134 58.102 1.807 549.998 556
Young Population (%) 13.605 2.453 5.837 19.547 556
Old Population (%) 23.264 6.570 10.123 44.389 556
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.649 2.306 2.415 15.785 556
Purchasing Power Index 77.022 22.785 47.36 232.54 556
Min Property Tax Rate (0/1) 0.135 0.342 0 1 556
Panel D: Political variables
Lagged Turnout (%) 61.537 5.445 41.058 74.332 556
Mayor Aligned (0/1) 0.397 0.490 0 1 556
Mayor Term (No.) 2.966 1.888 1 10 556
Mayor Left (0/1) 0.509 0.500 0 1 556
Note: Summary statistics refer to the panel of 268 mainland Portuguese municipalities in 2011, where the local
incumbent party ran for reelection over the period of analysis.
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1.3.3 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy exploits variation across municipalities in the program scope
to reassessed the taxable value of urban property. Inspired by Casaburi and Troiano
(2016), I implement a continuous difference-in-differences approach based on municipal
level property reassessment intensity. The baseline specification is as follows:
yit = β0 + β1Postt · PRintensityi +Xit · Pretδ + αi + λt + ηd · λt + it (1.1)
where yit is any of the outcome variables under study presented in panel B of Table
1.2 vote share of the socialist party; vote share of the right-wing coalition; difference
in vote share between the right-wing coalition and the socialist party; sum in the
vote share of left-wing parties; sum in the vote share of parties with no parliamentary
representation; and the sum of blank plus null votes (percentage). β1 captures the effect
of interest. PRintensityi is the intensity of property reassessments in municipality i,
captured by the share of non-reassessment properties in 2011 presented in panel A
of Table 1.2. The dummy Postt is equal to 1 for the election year after the reform,
2015. Xit is a vector of control variables, including the socioeconomic and political
characteristics previously described - in panels C and D of Table 1.2. The dummy
Pret is equal to 1 for the election years before the reform, 2009 and 2011. αi are
the municipality fixed effects and λt the election year fixed effects. Finally, to capture
any regional macro shocks occurring between elections, region times election year fixed
effects ηd ·λt are also included, where d represents the 18 regions in Portugal, Districts.
Furthermore, I provide a heterogeneous effects analysis to compare the electoral
effects across different types of municipalities in terms of growth rate of the property
tax base, in order to investigate whether where voters are more likely to be more harmed
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react differently this shock in their tax liabilities.The model to estimate is as follows:
yit = β0 + β1Postt · PRintensityi + β2Postt ∗ PRintensityi ·Hi
+ β3Postt ·Hi +Xit · Pretδ + αi + λt + ηd · λt + it
(1.2)
where Hi is dummy variable based on the growth rate of the property tax base due
to the reassessments between 2011 and 2014. The dummy switches on when the tax
base growth rate in municipality i is above the median growth rate.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Electoral Response: Parliamentary Elections
Whether voters reacted to the impact of the property reassessments at the parliamen-
tary elections of 2015 and how they voted poses important empirical questions. On
the one hand, the reform represented a significant increase in property tax liabilities.
On the other hand, given the political unpopularity and people’s negative reaction to
the reform, the Government decided to implement a tax cap policy until 2014 - which
smoothed out payment of the increase in tax burden due to the reassessments over the
pre-election period - reducing the significantly the salience of the shock. Ergo, in this
part of the analysis I aim to test the hypothesis that there should not be a significant
overall response at parliamentary elections following the reform.
For that, I rely on the 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities data over three cen-
tral election years - 2009, 2011 and 2015. Table 1.3 collects the difference-in-differences
results from the estimation of Equation 1.1 on all outcome variables, presented in each
column respectively: (1) vote share of the socialist party; (2) vote share of the right-
wing coalition; (3) difference in vote share between the right-wing coalition and the
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socialist party; (4) sum in the vote share of left-wing parties; (5) sum in the vote share
of parties with no parliamentary representation; and (6) the sum of blank plus null
votes (percentage).













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PR Intensity x Post -9.898 13.005 22.903 -10.276 -2.728 -1.277
(7.59) (7.89) (14.73) (7.48) (1.78) (1.41)
Obs. 834 834 834 834 834 834
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (1.1). All estimates include municipality
a vector of control variables in the pre-treatment period, election year fixed effects and district times
election year fixed effects. Refer to panels C and D of Table 1.2 for the list of control variables. Robust
standard errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5%
and 1% significance, respectively.
It is obtained that property reassessments do not have significant effect on any of
electoral outcomes. This result suggests that in fact the tax cap policy decreased the
salience of the property tax reform and so voters overall did not respond to it.
1.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects: Property Tax Base Growth
The reform is not likely to affect the entire population in an even manner: two munic-
ipalities with the same share of non-reassessed properties in 2011, might experience a
different impact in their property tax liabilities due to the reappraisal procedure, as it
depends on the actual change in the property tax base. Hence, by exploring the growth
rate of this tax base it’s possible to isolate the real effect of the reassessments on the
increase of the tax liabilities.
I calculate the growth rate of the property tax base between 2011 and 2014 as
follows:
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Tax Base GR =
Tax Base2014 − Non-Reassessed Tax Base2011
Non-Reassessed Tax Base2011
(1.3)
where Tax Base2014 is given by property tax revenue of 2014 divided by the property
tax rate of 2014. I focus on the tax base of 2014 as this determines the property
tax liabilities to be paid in April of 2015, before the parliamentary elections. Which
is also the first year after the reform when the tax cap no longer applies and tax
payers have to pay the full increase due to the reassessments. On the other hand,
Non-Reassessed Tax Base2011 is computed as the property tax revenue of 2011 times
the share of non-reassessed properties and then divided by the property tax rate of
2011. Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics for this variable and Figure 1.3 shows
the spatial distribution of property tax base growth rate between for all 278 mainland
Portuguese municipalities - refer to Appendix A.3 for more details about the distribution
of this variable.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Property Tax Base Growth Rate 3.176 1.002 0.878 8.412 278
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics
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Figure 1.3: Property Reassessment Intensity in 2011
Another empirical prediction is that voting patterns might differ between municipal-
ities with different real effects of property reassessments. Hence, I take the property tax
base growth rate variable and I implement then a triple difference approach exploring
these heterogeneities across municipalities. Table 1.5 collects results from the estima-
tion of Equation 1.2 on all outcome variables, presented in each column respectively. I
obtain that in municipalities with a higher property tax base growth rate punish more
the incumbent government party at the time of the reform, the right-wing coalition.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PR Intensity x Post -10.579 16.313** 26.892* -12.700 -3.613** -1.091
(7.64) (8.18) (14.97) (7.72) (1.83) (1.35)
x Tax Base 3.467 -18.373** -21.839 13.509* 4.864* -1.147
(8.01) (7.85) (14.61) (7.16) (2.70) (1.19)
Obs. 834 834 834 834 834 834
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (1.1). All estimates include municipality a vector
of control variables in the pre-treatment period, election year fixed effects and district times election year
fixed effects. Refer to panels C and D of Table 1.2 for the list of control variables. Robust standard errors
clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance,
respectively.
1.5 Internal Validity
The second important identification assumption relies on the “parallel trends” condition
(Meyer, 1995). For it to hold, the trend in each of the dependent variables under study
must be the same for all municipalities in the absence of treatment. This assumption
can be tested through different procedures. The most standard approach consists in
regressing the outcome variable on yearly dummies indicating the treatment group
(Moser and Voena, 2012). This can be assessed by the following model:
yit = β0 +
m∑
j=−q
βjPRintensityi,j +Xit · Pretδ + αi + λt + ηd · λt + it (1.4)
where the sum allows for q pre-treatment effects and m post-treatment effects. The
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remaining variables are defined as before. Figure 1.4 provides the annual average treat-
ment effects obtained from the estimation of Equation 1.4.







































Figure 1.4: Event Study Plots depict the Coefficients estimates obtained from regressing Equation 1.4 on
each electoral outcome variable. Capped lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals
There are no difference in trends before treatment,supporting the assumption of
common trends in the electoral outcomes under study. Thus, DD coefficient estimates
can be assumed to capture the causal effect of treatment intensity on the electoral
outcomes.
A potential problem with DD estimations that should be taken into account relates
to issues of selection bias. A key identification assumption is that municipalities are
exogenously assigned to treatment. Solely when this holds, one can causally identify
the effect of the reform as the differential change in the outcome variables from pre- to
post-treatment period. If it is not the case causality is then undermined.5
One can test for selection bias in a number of ways. One possibility is to study
5For a discussion on the importance of choosing careful comparison groups to evaluate place-based
policies see Neumark and Simpson (2015).
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whether some specific municipality characteristics at the time of treatment determined
the intensity of property reassessments. The most common approach in the context of
a DD framework to test for selection bias is to devise placebo tests. These tests usually
consist on reestimating the baseline results relying on a placebo treatment setting in at
a fake treatment year. Here, the sample is restricted to the pre-treatment period, i.e.
focusing only on the parliamentary elections of 2009 and 20011, and 2011 is considered
as the treatment year. As Table 1.6 shows, all estimates are insignificant - with the
exception of the vote share for parties with no parliamentary representation - dismissing
any remaining concerns of a possible selection bias.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo x Post2011 -1.020 -3.076 -2.056 6.000 -2.925** -0.489
(4.46) (4.27) (8.11) (4.71) (1.42) (1.21)
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (1.1). All estimates include municipality
a vector of control variables in the pre-treatment period, election year fixed effects and district times
election year fixed effects. Refer to panels C and D of Table 1.2 for the list of control variables. Robust
standard errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%,
5% and 1% significance, respectively.
The same test is conducted for the triple difference estimation and Table 1.7 presents
the results. All estimates are once again insignificant, dismissing any remaining con-
cerns of a possible selection bias.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo x Post2011 -4.040 -2.892 1.148 5.868 -2.976* -0.137
(5.60) (5.68) (10.59) (6.32) (1.57) (1.42)
x Tax Base 7.681 0.738 -6.943 -1.916 1.179 -0.117
(5.18) (5.78) (10.22) (6.19) (2.09) (1.42)
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (1.1). All estimates include municipality a
vector of control variables in the pre-treatment period, election year fixed effects and district times election
year fixed effects. Refer to panels C and D of Table 1.2 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this article, I study the political consequences of a mass reappraisal reform. For that,
I focus on the financial assistance program to Portugal in 2011, which put in place an
urgent wave of property reassessments in all municipalities, and the electoral response
at the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2015. I use an original database for all
278 mainland Portuguese municipalities three electoral years: 2009, 2011 and 2015.
The baseline results show that the intensity of reassessments had not a statistically
significant impact on any vote share outcome. This might be explained by the reduction
of salience of the reform due to tax cap policy that smoothed out the increment in tax
liabilities. Heterogeneous effects based on the real effect of the reassessment, in turn,
indicate that in municipalities where, on average, tax liabilities augmented more, voters




Evidence from a Reform in
Portugal1
2.1 Introduction
The question of whether property taxes are capitalized into real estate market values is
an old topic in public economics.2 The answer has scholar but also practical relevance
since property taxes affect both individual and government budgets and may, therefore,
have real efficiency and equity consequences.3 Nevertheless, a clear answer to this
question has been proven challenging, mainly due to serious empirical concerns.
From a theoretical point of view, the property tax capitalization is based on the
assumption that both house characteristics and factors affecting the cost of living de-
termine the net present value a prospective buyer is willing to pay for a house [Oates
1This is a joint work with Joa˜o Pereira dos Santos
2For a survey on the broader implications of house price capitalization see Hilber (2015).
3For example, recent micro contributions show that changes in house prices may have implications
for aggregate consumption (Mian, Rao, and Sufi, 2013).
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(1969) and Yinger (1982)]. Therefore, if a property tax reduction is viewed by the
buyers as a decrease in the cost of living, they will be willing to pay higher prices.
Taking the supply of land and housing as fixed, lower present and future tax payments
are then expected to inflate the market value of real estate.
Empirically, there are two main identification issues that must be taken into account.
First, the level of public goods is positively correlated with the property tax level, and
both independently affect the house prices. For this reason, it is difficult to isolate
the effect of the tax separately. Second, there is a likely simultaneity bias between the
property tax rate and house prices when local governments set their own tax rate: areas
with a high house price level, all else equal, are able to set a lower tax rate to collect a
certain amount of tax revenues.
In this paper, we tackle these issues by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment: an
unexpected reduction in the upper bound of the Portuguese property tax rate for urban
real estate announced by the Prime-Minister on July 2, 2008. This reform allows to
divide mainland municipalities in treated (those that were forced to decrease their
tax rate) and comparison municipalities. Under the assumption of parallel trends in
housing transaction developments of the two groups, the difference-in-differences setting
estimates the causal effect of this reform on real estate values. In Portugal, the property
tax is set by the municipality, on a tax range defined by the central government. The
value of the tax base (i.e., the fiscal value of property) is also decided centrally. We
take advantage of a comprehensive dataset based on a single country where all local
governments operate under the same institutional framework. This dataset includes
socioeconomic, fiscal, and political variables on all mainland Portuguese municipalities
from 2005 to 2011.
We find that affected municipalities observed an increase in the mean transaction
value of urban real estate vis-a`-vis the comparison group. Thus, supporting the hypoth-
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esis of property tax capitalization. In other words, our findings suggest that buyers take
into consideration the lower costs of owning the house which are reflected in a market
price increase with the net present value of the tax reduction. Throughout the paper,
we contrast these findings in a sample including all mainland municipalities and in a
restricted version with more homogenous municipalities. Our conclusions are robust to
several specification checks and falsification tests that are performed to dismiss selec-
tion bias concerns and alternative mechanisms. In particular, we observe no significant
impact on local expenditures, suggesting that there were not differences in public good
provision due to the reform allowing us to also rule out the other critical identification
issue mentioned above. Furthermore, the property tax law creates an interesting natural
counter-factual since rural real estate is subject to a different tax regime that suffered
no changes. Unsurprisingly, we find no effects of the reform on this particular outcome.
Furthermore, we observe no significant impact on local expenditures, suggesting that
there were not potential differences in public good provision due to the reform allowing
us to also rule out the other critical identification issue mentioned above.
Several recent empirical studies have focused on the impact of taxation on the
housing market, namely the effect of transaction taxes [Dachis, Duranton, and Turner
(2012), Besley, Meads, and Surico (2014), Kopczuk and Munroe (2015), Hilber and
Lyytika¨inen (2017), Slemrod, Weber, and Shan (2017),Best and Kleven (2018)] and
income taxes (Basten, von Ehrlich, and Lassmann, 2017). Nevertheless, the empirical
literature on property taxation is still scarce due to the endogeneity concerns previously
mentioned. Most early work on property taxation supports a full or partial capitaliza-
tion in house prices [for a survey, see Ross and Yinger (1999), Sirmans, Gatzlaff, and
Macpherson (2008) or Hilber, Lyytika¨inen, and Vermeulen (2011)]. These studies are
mainly focused in a local government context with cross-sectional variation in property
tax rates. However, despite the fact that both identification issues previously described
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have been known and discussed since the seminal paper by Oates (1969), few studies
have successfully dealt with them. For instance, Cushing (1984) and Palmon and Smith
(1998) solve the simultaneity and measurement problems by estimating capitalization
in a context where the property tax rate is unrelated to local public services and find
support for full capitalization. However, both analysis are based on limited datasets.
More recently, Elinder and Persson (2017) focus in a national property tax reform
in Sweden, thus unrelated to local public goods, providing good identification of a large
property tax cut on house prices. In this setting, the authors find no evidence that
the tax reduction led to increases in house prices with the exception of a small seg-
ment of the market containing properties with very high tax values. Moreover, Bradley
(2017) exploits temporary idiosyncratic differences accruing to new homebuyers in the
Michigan property tax system to study the degree to which these initial tax obligations
are capitalized. The idea is to assess whether households recognize intertemporal dis-
continuities in property tax bases and obligations. The author finds that homebuyers
overcompensate sellers of homes with relatively low tax obligations, as if such rules
would persist indefinitely.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we
describe some institutional details, namely regarding the Portuguese local finance and
the property tax reform of 2008. Sections 2.3 presents the data used and explains the
identification strategy followed. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we discuss the main results and
several robustness checks, respectively. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Portuguese Local Finance
Portuguese local governments have control over their spending – subject to common
laws and regulations – but they do not score very high in terms of local revenue au-
tonomy (OECD, 1999). The reason for the reduced local autonomy is twofold: high
reliance on transfers from the central government and reduced freedom to set local tax
rates (on centrally set tax bases). Local revenue sources consist essentially of local
taxes, transfers from the central and regional governments, and transfers from the EU.
The main local taxes are an indirect tax on the transfer of real estate (Imposto Munici-
pal sobre as Transmisso˜es Onerosas de Imo´veis, IMT), the local property tax (Imposto
Municipal sobre Imo´veis, IMI), a variable tax share of the central government personal
income tax (Imposto sobre o Rendimento de pessoas Singulares, IRS), and a munici-
pal surcharge on corporate income tax (Derrama). Transfers from central government
and EU and the revenues of the property tax (IMI) present the highest shares, both
significantly greater than the share of any other local source of revenue.
The current Portuguese property tax, IMI, was introduced in 2003 as a result of a
general reform of the Portuguese tax system. Local authorities have some discretionary
power over the property tax and every year they set tax rate within an interval common
to every municipality. Local property taxe rates are set within a range which is defined
by the central government, as displayed in Table 2.1. This table displays the lower and
upper bound of property tax rates for both urban and rural real estate, before and after
the reform.
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Table 2.1: Property Tax Rates: Minimum and Maximum Values
Year Urban Rural
Min Max
2003-2007 0.20% 0.50% 0.80%
2008-2011 0.20% 0.40% 0.80%
Source: Portuguese tax authority.
In order to better understand the consequences of the reform, it is important to
discern the differences between the legal definitions of urban and rural real estate in
Portugal. According to the Portuguese property tax code (CIMI4) the characterization
of the real estate depends on its use. It is defined as urban all residential, commercial
or industrial real estate and any land already approved for construction. In contrast,
it is considered a rural real estate when it does not meet the criteria of an urban real
estate, namely those without any construction in place or approved, waters, plantations
or when used for agricultural purposes.
2.2.2 Property Tax Reform of 2008
On July 2, 2008, the Portuguese Prime Minister unexpectedly announced a reform
forcing the property tax rate upper bound to decrease from 0.5% to 0.4% for urban
real estate, as we can observe above in Table 2.1. The politician promised that this
would benefit hundreds of thousands of real estate owners.5 This surprise announcement
caused an immediate reaction by the President of the Mayor’s Association (Associac¸a˜o
Nacional de Munic´ıpios) who accused the central government of easing the taxpayers’
fiscal burden at the expense of someone else’s money. This representative forecasted the
4Co´digo do Imposto Municipal sobre Imo´veis approved by Decree-Law no. 287/2003, of 12 Novem-
ber.
5Headline in Expresso, an important Portuguese newspaper.
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impact at 12.5% of total revenues.6. All this significantly amplified the media attention
devoted to the reform.
The reform allows us to divide the municipalities in mainland Portugal in two
groups.7 One group includes the 94 municipalities setting a tax rate higher than 0.4%
before the reform, i.e. those that were forced to decrease it. This is our treatment
group and all other municipalities compose the comparison group. In appendix B.1,
figure B.1 (a) depicts the spatial distribution of these two groups. For robustness, we
contrast all estimation results using the full sample of mainland municipalities with
a more restricted version where we focus on municipalities with a more homogeneous
choice of property tax rates in 2007, the year before the shock. In order to keep inter-
vals of similar length, we remove municipalities who choose a tax rate lower or equal
to 0.3 in 2007. This means that we compare treated municipalities choosing a tax rate
on the following interval (0.4; 0.5] with control municipalities in the the interval (0.3;
0.4]. This restricted sample is shown in figure B.1 (b). The 65 removed municipalities
are mainly clustered in more remote areas close to the border with Spain.
Furthermore, it is also important to notice above in Table 2.1 that this reform did
not alter the tax rate applied to rural real estate with no buildings, that was kept at
0.8%. This allow us to build a counter-factual analysis, supporting the main analysis
if no effects of the reform are found this type of properties.
6See the news articles in Pu´blico newspaper and in TVI website.
7Peralta and Pereira dos Santos (2018) use a similar empirical strategy to study the impact of a
tax revenue cut on the mayoral decision of seeking re-election.
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2.3 Data and Identification Strategy
2.3.1 Data
This analysis relies on an extensive dataset at Portuguese municipal level over the
period 2005–2011. The outcome variable is a logarithmic transformation of the mean
value of urban real estate transactions per municipality (in real terms) obtained from
Statistics Portugal (INE ).8 As a counter-factual exercise, we also look at the the mean
value of rural real estate transactions of land with no buildings per municipality (in
real terms).
For robustness, the analysis includes also a number of control variables, namely
socio–demographic, economic and political characteristics, local public finance variables
and electoral results. Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the two outcome
variables and all control variables.
The socio–demographic variables comprise measures of the municipal population,
the share of the working population with a tertiary degree, and the share of immigrants
employed in the municipality. Population density is taken from INE and, to account for
different age-structures, we also include the municipal dependency ratio. The average
educational level and the share of immigrants are computed from Quadros de Pessoal.9
As for the economic characteristics, we include two proxies for municipal income
level – the consumption of electricity per capita (in logs), taken from INE, and the
unemployment rate. The latter is measured by the ratio of resident population aged
between 15 and 65 years old who is enrolled as unemployed in the Portuguese Institute
of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP). In addition, we add the share of the
8The mean value of real estate transactions is computed as the value of real estate transactions
divided by the number of transactions in each municipality, whose data series are both obtained from
Statistics Portugal. These values are then deflated to the year 2015 by the national consumer price
index from the Statistics Database of the European Commission (Eurostat).
9The effect of immigration on house prices was analyzed for the US (Saiz, 2007), Spain (Gonzalez
and Ortega, 2013), Italy (Accetturo, Manaresi, Mocetti, and Olivieri, 2014), and the UK (Sa´, 2015).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mean Transaction Value (log):
Urban 1946 4.089 .577 2.328 6.592
Rural 1946 2.776 1.404 -1.161 7.853
Demographic
Population Density 1946 .312 .847 .005 7.3797
Dependency Ratio 1946 .590 .120 .382 1.088
Education Level 1946 .068 .032 .015 .302
Immigrant Share 1946 .083 .054 .003 .337
Economic
Unemployment Rate 1946 6.615 2.345 1.483 16.933
Electricity Consumption 1946 8.211 .486 7.277 11.106
Touristic Area (%) 1946 .003 .012 0 .105
Public Goods
Average Exam Score 1946 2.705 .270 1.891 4
Crime Rate 1946 30.915 13.294 6.9 161.4
Hospital Dummy 1946 .311 .463 0 1
Court Dummy 1946 .740 .438 0 1
Official Clinics (¿1) 1946 .104 .306 0 1
Highway Access Dummy 1946 .548 .498 0 1
Political
Left–wing Seats Share 1946 .552 .253 0 1
Aligned Mayor 1946 .387 .487 0 1
Majority Local Gov. 1946 .900 .300 0 1
touristic area as a proxy for touristic amenities in the municipality. This series is taken
from INE.
Furthermore, we consider several variables on local public finance and on the pro-
vision of public goods.10 This issue is particularly important since a number of neigh-
10See Gibbons and Machin (2008) for a survey on the effects of school quality, better transport, and
lower crime rates on house prices.
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borhood features tend to be difficult to observe by the econometrician. In this regard,
we include the average national exam score (mean of the 9th-year exams of mathemat-
ics and Portuguese) in each municipality to control for the quality of public schools.11
Other control variables related to public good provision included are: the municipal
crime rate; a dummy for the existence of a court of first instance in the municipality;
a dummy for the existence of a hospital in the municipality; and a dummy indicating
whether there is one or more than one official clinic in the municipality. We consider
also transportation infrastructure provision by adding a binary variable which takes the
value one if there is at least one highway crossing a given municipality.12 All of these
variables are taken from INE.
Finally, the set of municipality’s political characteristics and electoral results is
constructed based on data obtained from the General Directorate for Internal Affairs’
(Direcc¸a˜o–Geral da Administrac¸a˜o Interna, DGAI ) website. This analysis uses infor-
mation on the local elections of 2001, 2005 and 2009. The data is provided at the party
level per municipality, consisting on the number of votes and seats allocated to each
party. We include the share of seats in the municipal council occupied by left–wing
members. For the winning party in each municipality two dummy variables are con-
structed: one indicating whether it is from the same party as the central government
and other indicating whether the party obtained a majority of seats in the municipal
council.
11There is an extensive literature showing that better schools are capitalized into house prices (see,
inter alia, Downes and Zabel (2002), Fack and Grenet (2010) Ries and Somerville (2010), Dhar and
Ross (2012), Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2013), and La (2015)). Moreover, Figlio and Lucas (2004)
point out that this capitalization effect is greater the more available is the information on school
quality. Nunes, Reis, and Seabra (2015) analyze the effects of the publication of school rankings in
Portugal.
12Audretsch, Dohse, and dos Santos (2017) highlight the importance of highways for regional devel-
opment in Portugal.
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2.3.2 Empirical Model
We aim to test whether property taxes are capitalized into real estate market values.
For this, we take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Portugal: an unexpected
property tax reform in Portugal. The reform took place in 2008 and forced a decrease
of the property tax rate upper bound on urban real estate from 0.5% to 0.4%.
The nature of the property tax reform establishes pre- and post-treatment periods
that allow for a quasi–experimental difference–in-differences (DD) approach.13 Our
unit of observation is the municipality. Let Di be the dummy indicating treatment,
equal to one for all municipalities in the treatment group and zero for all municipalities
in the control group. That is, this dummy takes the value one if municipality i was
setting a tax rate higher than 0.4% in 2007 and zero otherwise. Throughout the analysis
we consider two samples that vary solely in the control municipalities included. The
Full Sample includes all 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities and the control group
includes all those not in the treatment one. In contrast, in the Restricted Sample the
control municipalities are the ones setting a tax rate in 2007 within the the interval
(0.3%; 0.4%]. By excluding municipalities setting a lower tax rate allow us a more
robust analysis, as we are comparing groups with more similar fiscal preferences.
The reform was announced in 2008 and this is when the post-treatment period
starts. Accordingly, let dt be a time dummy that switches to one in the year of the
treatment assignment, i.e. dt = 1[t ≥ 2008].
Inference on the average treatment effect of the reform is based on the following
13Our identification strategy is inspired by the empirical analysis of Lyytika¨inen (2012) and Baskaran
(2014), who rely on similar centrally legislated changes in local tax ranges. Lyytika¨inen (2012) uses
a change in minimum tax rates set by the Finnish central government for property taxes to identify
local tax competition; and Baskaran (2014) uses a difference-in-differences approach by comparing two
German states, of which North Rhine-Westphalia faced an increase in business and property tax rates.
In Portugal, Peralta and Pereira dos Santos (2019) use the reform at study and a similar empirical
mechanism to measure the impact of a tax revenue cut on the mayoral decision of seeking re-election.
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general DD regression model:
yit = βTit +X
′
itδ + γi + λt + it (2.1)
where yit is any of the outcome variables under study, Tit = (Di ·dt) and β1 captures
the effect of interest, and Xit is a vector of control variables, including the socio–
economic and political characteristics previously described. Finally, γi are the munici-
pality fixed effects (to control for time-invariant factors) and λt the time-period fixed
effects.
In addition, the pattern of lagged and forward effects is also of interest as it often
provides further and more insightful information on the dynamics of the treatment
effects. Therefore, average annual treatment effects are assessed through the following






itδ + γi + λt + it (2.2)
where the sum allows for m ”leads” or pre–treatment effects and for q ”lags” or
post–treatment effects. The remaining variables are defined as before. This design has
two main advantages. First, we can test the exogeneity of the shock by evaluating pre-
trends. Second, this approach enables to evaluate the short and medium run impact of
the tax reform on the real estate prices.
Finally, for the purpose of studying the intensity of treatment effects the regression
model in Equation 2.1 is extended to encompass interaction with the imposed decrease
of the tax rate. The treatment intensity effects are obtained within the following re-
gression framework:
yit = β(Ii · Tit) +X ′itδ + γi + λt + it (2.3)
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where Ii is the imposed decrease in the tax rate due to the reform, i.e. the difference
between the tax rate set in 2007 and the new tax rate upper bound for the treated
municipalities and zero otherwise.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 The Common Trends Assumption
Internal validity of a DD estimation relies on the standard “parallel trends” condition
(Meyer, 1995). For it to hold, the trend in each of the dependent variables under study
must be the same for all municipalities in the absence of treatment. This assumption
can be tested through different procedures. One common approach is to compare the
evolution of the different outcome variables in treated and control municipalities during
period of analysis (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Figure 2.1 provides mean plots for mean
value of real estate transaction of urban dwellings (in logs and real terms) for both the
full and the restricted sample.
In fact, until announcement of the reform, the graph provide substantive evidence of
identical trends, in the two samples, between treatment and comparison municipalities.
After the year of the assignment of treatment, in 2008, the two groups start to present
subtle differential trends. Hence, this figure illustrates that there are no preexisting
trends capable of undermining the empirical design.
Catarina Alvarez 43
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Urban Real Estate Transactions
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Notes: Evolution of mean values for treatment and control groups over the period
2005–2011.
A second approach consists in regressing the outcome variable on yearly dummies
indicating the treatment group (Moser and Voena, 2012). This can be assessed by the






itδ + γi + λt + it (2.4)
where the sum allows for m ”leads” or pre–treatment effects. The remaining variables
are defined as before. The omitted category is 2007, the year before the announcement
of the reform. Figure 2.2 presents the results, where the coefficient estimates measure
how outcome variables differ between treatment and control municipalities before the
reform. As suggested by the previous test, on average, treatment and control real estate
markets did not differ significantly in the pre–treatment period in both samples.
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Notes: Coefficient estimates for the a model given by Equation 2.4 over the period
2005–2007. Caped lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
In summary, the tests support the assumption of common trends in the property tax
outcomes under study for treatment and control municipalities. Thus, DD coefficient
estimates can be assumed to capture the causal effect of treatment.
2.4.2 Post-Reform Effects
We first estimate Equation 2.1 considering the mean value of urban real estate transac-
tions as the dependent variable and vectors of control variables are gradually included:
in column (1) no control variables are included in the model; in column (2) we consider
population density, dependency ratio, education level and immigrants share; in column
(3) we include also the unemployment rate, consumption of electricity per capita (log)
and share of touristic area; in column (4) we then consider the average exam score
(mean of mathematics and Portuguese), crime rate, dummy for court, dummy for hos-
pital, dummy for more than one official clinic and dummy for highway access; finally,
the political control variables are included in column (5), namely the share of left–wing
seats, mayor aligned with central government and majority in the local government. All
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estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at municipal level. The results are presented in Table 2.3 and are very similar in all
specifications and for both the full and the restricted samples.
Table 2.3: Property Tax Reform Effects on Urban Real Estate Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full Sample
Tit 0.063 0.060 0.064 0.060 0.062
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Tit 0.066 0.064 0.068 0.062 0.065
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1491 1491 1491 1491 1491
Controls:
– Demographic X X X X
– Economic X X X
– Public Goods X X
– Political X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the mean value of total real estate transactions (in real terms). All estimates
include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal
level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance,
respectively.
We find a positive and significant effect of the reform on the mean value of total real
estate transactions. Point estimates marginally decrease as more controls are included,
and in the more conservative model, we obtain an effect of around 6%, which suggests
that property tax capitalization is at place. The results are robust to a plethora of
checks, which we explore in more detail in Section 2.5.
The annual average treatment effects in Figure 2.3 in turn, obtained from esti-
mating Equation 2.2, are in line with the previous assessment and provide additional
information as to the timing of the buyers response to property tax reform. In fact,
this parametric event study suggests that the bulk of the effect is concentrated in the
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first year after the announcement. Additionally, as time goes by, mayors are able to
better cope with the consequences of the reform by re-adapting their policies to the
new environment.
Figure 2.3: Yearly Effects of the Reform on Urban Real Estate Transactions
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Note: This figure provides plots depicting the coefficient estimates for yearly dummy variables
indicating the treated group over the period, 2005–2011. Coefficients are obtained estimated
the a model given by Eq. (2.2), including a vector of control variables and controlling for
municipality and year fixed effects. Caped lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Finally, we proceed to the estimation of the treatment intensity effects by estimating
Equation 2.3. Table 2.4 presents the results for both the overall and the restricted
sample. We find that municipalities who experienced a higher decrease in the tax rate
also experienced a higher increase in their real estate mean transaction value.
2.5 Robustness
The results are robust to a plethora of checks. Firstly, we replicate the baseline esti-
mation in Table 2.3 but applying different clustering levels for the standard errors - at
the NUTS III and regional level. Appendix B.2 presents the results that are basically
identical to those presented before. Secondly, we take into account some heterogeneity
in the dynamics of urban real estate transactions that might affect the magnitude of
the reform effect by including population and regional trends. Moreover, we address a
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Table 2.4: Intensity Effects on Urban Real Estate Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full Sample
Iit x Tit 0.650 0.619 0.670 0.615 0.628
(0.24)*** (0.24)** (0.24)*** (0.23)*** (0.23)***
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Iit x Tit 0.665 0.652 0.694 0.628 0.653
(0.25)*** (0.25)*** (0.24)*** (0.24)*** (0.24)***
Obs. 1491 1491 1491 1491 1491
Controls:
– Demographic X X X X
– Economic X X X
– Public Goods X X
– Political X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.3). The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the mean value of total real estate transactions (in real terms). All estimates
include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal
level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance,
respectively.
crucial problem with DD estimations related to issues of selection into treatment. For
that, we replicate the estimations by excluding some critical groups of municipalities,
we run the standard placebo tests and a counter-factual analysis of rural real estate
transactions. Finally, we focus on the identification concern related to the local public
goods provision.
2.5.1 Population and Regional Trends
In order to account for heterogeneous dynamics of urban real estate transactions, such
as the municipality size or regional shocks, we include in the baseline regression: i) pre-
treatment municipal population quartile dummies interacted with year dummies, ii) a
regional time trend, and iii) region dummies interacted with time dummies. Region
dummies comprise the 18 regional Portuguese districts. The results, reported in Table
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2.5, are once again extremely similar to our baseline ones.
Table 2.5: Robustness: Including Population and Regional Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full Sample
Tit 0.065 0.065 0.044 0.055 0.053
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)**
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Tit 0.074 0.068 0.049 0.062 0.062
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)***
Obs. 1491 1491 1491 1491 1491
Pop Quartile X X X
Region Trend X X X
Region x Year X X X
Controls X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.1). The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the mean value of urban real estate transactions (in real terms). All
estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
2.5.2 Selection Bias
A potential problem with DD estimations that should be taken into account relates
to issues of selection bias. A key identification assumption is that municipalities are
exogenously assigned to treatment and control group. Solely when this holds, one
can causally identify the effect of the reform as the differential change in the outcome
variables from pre- to post-treatment period between in treated and non-treated mu-
nicipalities. If it is not the case and there may be intrinsic differences between the two
groups, causality is then undermined.14
14For a discussion on the importance of choosing careful comparison groups to evaluate place-based
policies see Neumark and Simpson (2015).
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One can test for selection bias in a number of ways. One possibility is to exclude
more urban municipalities. This has the advantage of providing a more homogeneous
sample, as urban municipalities may differ from the rest of the country in a number
of ways. Therefore, by solely focusing on less urban areas, we mitigate the risk of
mistakenly reflecting confounders by rulling out possible outliers. We test this possi-
bility restricting the full sample in four ways: i) excluding the metropolitan areas of
Lisbon and Oporto, ii) excluding all coastal municipalities; iii) excluding the 18 district
capitals15; and iv) restricting to municipalities applying even more similar property tax
rates in 2007. This latter test is very demanding as it leaves us with a particularly small
sample. Table 2.6 shows the results where Equation 2.1 is reestimated excluding these
several groups of municipalities. In columns (7) and (8), the Conservative Sample only
considers municipalities setting property tax rates between [0.4% and 0.5%) in 2007.
From the treatment group, we remove municipalities setting the tax rate at the previous
maximum whereas from the control group we only consider the municipalities setting a
tax rate equal to 0.4%. All other municipalities are excluded from the estimation. Even
though statistical significance decreases, point estimates are consistent with previous
results.
15Municipalities were grouped into 18 districts in 1835, replacing previous clerical dioceses. The
1976 Constitution abolished districts as an official local administrative unit. Still, they cluster, to a
certain extent, similar municipalities.
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Table 2.6: Selection Bias Tests I: Restricted Samples
No Metropolitan No Coastal No Capitals Conservative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tit 0.072 0.073 0.061 0.055 0.059 0.055 0.049 0.053
(0.02)***(0.02)***(0.02)**(0.02)**(0.02)***(0.02)**(0.03)* (0.03)*
Obs. 1708 1708 1694 1694 1820 1820 924 924
Controls X X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.1), without and with the vector of
control variables. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the mean value of urban real estate
transactions (in real terms). The control variables included are: population density; dependency
ratio; education level; immigrant share; unemployment rate; consumption of electricity per capita
(log); share of touristic area; average exam score (mean of mathematics and Portuguese); crime
rate; dummy for court; dummy for hospital; dummy for more than one official clinic; dummy for
highway access; share of left–wing seats; mayor aligned with central government; and majority in
the local government. All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
The most common approach in the context of a DD framework however, is to devise
placebo tests. These tests usually consist on reestimating the baseline results relying on
a placebo treatment setting in at a fake treatment year. Here, the sample is restricted
to the pre-treatment period, i.e. 2005-2007, and 2006 is considered as the treatment
year. As Columns (1) and (2) Table 2.7 show, estimates are close to zero and always
insignificant.
As a further analysis, we focus also on the effect on the rural real estate. The
property tax law provides a counterfactual since land with no buildings is subject to a
different tax regime that suffered no changes in 2008. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.7
present the results. Unsurprisingly, we find that there is no effect on the rural buildings.
This provides additional support for the validity of our results as the reform did not
change the tax rate applied to this type of buildings.
Catarina Alvarez 51
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Table 2.7: Selection Bias Tests II: Placebo and Rural Transactions
Placebo Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full Sample
Tit -0.005 0.004 -0.104 -0.041
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)* (0.07)
Obs. 834 834 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Tit -0.005 0.004 -0.025 0.024
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Obs. 834 834 1491 1491
Controls: X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.1). In columns
(1) and (2) the dependent variable is the logarithm of the mean value of urban
real estate transactions (in real terms). In columns (3) and (4) the dependent
variable is the logarithm of the mean value of rural real estate transactions (in real
terms) The control variables included are: population density; dependency ratio;
education level; immigrant share; unemployment rate; consumption of electricity
per capita (log); share of touristic area; average exam score (mean of mathematics
and Portuguese); crime rate; dummy for court; dummy for hospital; dummy for
more than one official clinic; dummy for highway access; share of left–wing seats;
mayor aligned with central government; and majority in the local government.
All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.
2.5.3 Local Public Good Provision
A critical identification concern of property tax capitalization is related with the local
public good provision and so it must be also taken into account in our identification
strategy. The main intuition is that if the reaction is substantially different in treated
and comparison municipalities, this risks the introduction of biases to our estimates.
In theory, one should note that if the property tax cut was translated into a lower
supply of public goods in the comparison group, the average real estate prices should
decrease – and not increase in these regions. Therefore, our estimates would represent
a lower bound of the true effect of the reform. Even though we cannot totally dismiss
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these concerns related to unobservables, we present some suggestive evidence that these
factors are not extremely important in this setting. If we run the event study design
2.2 with the log of total municipal expenditures net of interest payments as outcome
variable, we do not observe statistically significant results, as shown by Figure 2.4.16
This means that affected mayors were able to mix their tax choices, at least in the
short run, to keep expenditures constant. In addition, controlling for this variable in
our baseline specification leaves the point estimates basically unchallenged.18
Figure 2.4: Total Expenditures (log)
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Notes: Coefficient estimates for the a model given by Eq. (2.2) over the period
2005–2011. Caped lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
In summary, these analyses lend credence to the view that our empirical analysis is
able to assess the causal impact of the property tax reform on real estate prices.
16The same results hold if we substitute this variable by the log of capital expenditures (in real terms).
Both data series can be retrieved from the General Directorate for Local Authority’s (Direcc¸a˜o–Geral
das Autarquias Locais, DGAL) website.17.
18We decided not to include this control variable in our analysis due to endogeneity concerns. Results
adding this covariate are available from the authors upon request.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to determine if property tax differentials on real estates are
capitalized. The scarce empirical evidence has reported mixed results. The aftermath
of a reform introducing a lower maximum tax rate for urban properties is the perfect
laboratory to study whether there is an effect on housing prices. We take advantage
of this reform to establish causality using a rich dataset on the universe of mainland
Portuguese municipalities. We believe that this strategy allows for credible inference
upon the causal effects of this reform. Since the present paper studies the impact of a
nationwide policy, rather than a number of local jurisdictions, we also believe that it
presents a higher degree of external validity.
We perform several robustness checks and falsification tests to have a better view
regarding possible mechanisms. Our findings suggest that agents rationally incorporate
the decreased cost of living in their buying decisions, which are reflected in a market
price increase with the net present value of the tax reduction. Our results thus corrob-
orate standard capitalization theory. In our most conservative estimate, we observe an
increase close to 5%.
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Chapter 3
Term Limits: A new political scene
or business as usual? 1
3.1 Introduction
The discussion of the introduction of term limits dates back to early democratic soci-
eties. In one of the earliest definitions of democracy, Aristotle listed as a key character-
istic that “no man should hold the same office twice.”2 Accordingly, in Ancient Greece
one-year limits were imposed on some of the officials elected by random lottery. In fact,
this issue has occupied a prominent place in the political debate of modern democracies
since the founding fathers, as expressed by Thomas Jefferson “to prevent every danger
which might arise to American freedom by continuing too long in office the members of
the Continental Congress”.
In the academic context, this debate has contributed to a rich and extensive litera-
ture with arguments both for and against the introduction of term limits, as it eliminates
incumbency advantage and removes long-tenure incumbents from office. Advocates for
1This is a joint work with Mariana Lopes da Fonseca
2THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 258 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford University Press 1958).
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term limits argue that it allows the entry of potentially better politicians and eliminates
policy biases in favor of specific interest groups represented by long-serving incumbents.
On the other hand, term-limits impose a constraint on voters’ choice of representatives,
whose long tenure may be due to higher quality; or it may be that voters prefer a rep-
resentative with longer political longevity and stronger influence, who is able to more
successfully broker resources and legislation to their own benefit. By this token, the
introduction of term limits poses a relevant empirical question. For which evidence is
still scarce, mainly due to data limitations (Dal Bo´ et al., 2017).
In this paper we study the selection effects of term limits and our contribution is
twofold: we construct an extensive and unique dataset on Portuguese mayors’ personal
characteristics and we take advantage of a recent reform introducing mayoral term
limits in Portugal to identify its causal impact on political selection.
Term-limits were introduced in Portuguese local governments in 2006, and the first
effects came into play solely at the 2013 local elections. The law limited to three con-
secutive terms in the same municipality. Nevertheless, at the subsequent local elections
of 2009 all incumbent mayors were still able to rerun. Hence, as of 2013, many Por-
tuguese mayors were in office for twenty or thirty years, and two of them since the
first local elections in 1976. In total, 150 mayors from the 278 mainland municipalities
were forced to leave office, creating the first exogenously determined open-seat elec-
tions in Portugal. We take advantage of this reform as quasi-natural experiment to
examine its political selection effects. Our identification strategy relies on a difference-
in-differences approach estimating how these mayors’ personal characteristics differ on
average between municipalities with re-eligible and term-limited incumbents.
For this purpose, we constructed an extensive and unique dataset on personal char-
acteristics of Portuguese mayors at the past four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and
2013 - a total of 586 individuals in 278 municipalities. Some of these personal charac-
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teristics are publicly available, but self-reported by the elected politicians after taking
office and the overall data is rather incomplete and imprecise. Thus, we complemented
it manually using information found online or contacting directly the municipal coun-
cil. Taking all the available information, we compiled the following variables based on
mayors’ characteristics: their gender, the age when they took office for the first time,
the level of education, the area of education and the occupation before taking office.
Our baseline results show that municipalities affected by the reform elected politi-
cians, on average, older (around four years) and with a past political career. The
results are robust to several falsification tests, in particular concerning any potential
anticipation effects at the 2009 local election. This might suggest that before the im-
plementation of term limits, being a mayor in Portugal could be considered as a career
path, which one would stat at a young age and with no previous political experience.
Nevertheless, in order to corroborate this idea we need explore further the implications
of the reform, namely by looking at in detail at the type and number of years of political
experience. We are able to perform this analysis, since we have also data on all elected
councilmen.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we review
the related literature. Section 3.3 details the institutional background regarding the
Portuguese local politics and the electoral reform under analysis, as well as Portuguese
mayors’ characteristics. Section 3.4 presents our data, the empirical identification and
the main results. In section 3.5, we discuss the internal validity of the results obtained.
Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Related Literature
In democracies, frequent elections can be viewed as the main tool voters have to hold
politicians accountable. In that sense, term limits may seem paradoxical, as they re-
duce voters’ ability to hold politicians liable for their policy choices. This is the base
argument of agency literature (e.g., Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986)) that emphasizes the
disciplining role of elections and discusses the opportunistic behavior in which term-
limited incumbents engage during their last period, once reelection incentives disappear.
More recently, this argument has been contested by another strand of literature which
regards elections as distortionary under myopic or career concerned officeholders (Morris
(2001), Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) and Maskin and Tirole (2004)). This leads to adverse
selection, justifying the introduction of term limits (Chari, Jones, and Marimon, 1997).
Furthermore, it also claimed that under a binding term limit incumbents set policies
that “truthfully” reflect their preferences and interests allowing a better screening by
the voters (Glazer and Wattenberg (1996), Lopes da Fonseca (2019), Smart and Sturm
(2013)).
On another note, a large body of theoretical literature emphasizes the importance
of term limits in removing the barriers to entry created by incumbency advantage
and hence potentially improving political selection. That is, term limits eliminate
incumbency advantage periodically, increasing probability of entering for new politicians
- from different parties, coalitions, or political sectors - who would be less likely to
enter running against an incumbent and who could be also more productive. This
way, rotation in power increases, potentially eliminating biased policies in favor of the
coalitions represented by senior incumbents (Tabarrok (1996), Glaeser (1997) and Cain,
Hanley, and Kousser (2006)).
Given these theoretical predictions, the empirical assessment of the consequences
of term limits shall be studied in two dimensions. On the one hand, analyzing the
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reaction of incumbents when facing a term limit and whether elections create a disci-
plinary/distortionary effect. Empirical evidence – mostly based on the U.S. experience
and on fiscal outcomes – appears to support the disciplinary effect of elections (Besley
and Case, 1995, 2003, Crain and Oakley, 1995, Crain and Tollison, 1993). However,
there are a couple of exceptions: List and Sturm (2006) provide significant evidence of
distorting policy choices for a sample of U.S. governors between 1970 and 2000.
In addition, it might be also identified whether term limits, by creating more rotation
in power, lead to the entry and selection of better politicians. Fowler (1992) and
Grofman and Sutherland (1996) argue that term limits may increase the reelection rates
of incumbents because high–quality challengers postpone running until the seat becomes
open by mandatory rotation. Cain et al. (2006) find that while the introduction of term
limits successfully increases the turnover of individual incumbents and the fraction of
contested races, it fails to make races more competitive or increase party turnover.
Moreover, seats held by incumbents are less likely to be contested and that incumbents
tend to face challengers with less previous political experience. Querubin (2016) studies
a reform in the Philippines finds no increase in the turnover of incumbent families in
congress – distorting behavior of incumbents and challengers.
More recently, and in the Portuguese context, Lopes da Fonseca (2019) explores the
same reform as we focus here but looks at another dimension of the consequences of
term limits - its disciplinary or distortionary effects - by studying its the short-term
impact on local policy choices. She finds that lame ducks pursue more conservative fiscal
policies and this effect is primarily reflecting the behavior of right-wing politicians.3
3Also in the Portuguese context, Peralta and Pereira dos Santos (2019) look at political selection
effects from the property tax reform studied in Chapter 2.
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3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 Portuguese Local Politics
In Portugal, there are three levels of governance: central, municipal, and civil parishes.
There are in total 308 municipalities, from which 278 mainland municipalities. Por-
tuguese municipalities have control over their spending - subject to prevailing laws
and regulations - but they do not score very high in terms of local revenue autonomy
(OECD, 1999). The reason for the reduced local autonomy is twofold: high reliance on
transfers from the central government and reduced freedom to set local tax rates (on
centrally set tax bases). Local revenue sources consist mainly of local taxes, transfers
from the central and regional governments, and transfers from the EU. There are dif-
ferent local taxes, namely an indirect tax on the transfer of the real estate, the local
property tax, a variable tax share of the central government personal income tax, and
a municipal surcharge on corporate income tax.
The property tax is the main fiscal tool of Portuguese local governments: it is their
primary source of own revenue and over which they have some discretionary power over
the property tax rate. Every year, property tax rates are decided at the municipal
assembly - within an interval typical to every municipality and defined by the central
Government.
From 1926 to 1974, Portugal was governed by an authoritarian regime. In 1974,
democracy was restored, and regular elections have been held: presidential elections
every five years, and parliamentary and local elections every four years. At the munici-
pal level, voters decide their representatives in the municipal council (executive branch)
and the municipal assembly (legislative branch). The head candidate of the most voted
list to the municipal council is elected as mayor, the local top chief executive - the most
prestigious and influential political position at the local level.
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Until 2013, Portuguese local politicians did not face term limits. This means that
they could run indefinitely for office. This meant that they could run indefinitely for
office, which happened in fact and with high success rate as illustrated in Table 3.1.
This also created room for considerable variation in government longevity, as displayed
in Table 3.2. It shows the distribution of mayors by the number of terms in office in the
three previous local elections before the introduction of the term limits. For example, in
2009, we can observe that two politicians were reelected for their tenth term, meaning
that they been kept in office since the first local elections held in 1976.
Table 3.1: Rerunning & Success Rates.
1997 2001 2005 2009
Panel A: Officeholder
Rerun N 218 227 233 238
% 79 83 84 86
Win N 186 188 211 205
% 85 83 91 86
Panel B: Party
Win N 219 211 234 230
% 80 76 84 83
Obs. 275 278 278 278
Source: Lopes da Fonseca (2017).
3.3.2 Term Limits Reform
The draft Law on the implementation of term limits for Portuguese mayors was dis-
cussed on July 25th 2005 and approved in Parliament, but only entered into force on
January 1st 2006. 4 The law sets a three consecutive terms limit for local politicians,
after which they are not able to rerun for the mayoral position in the same jurisdic-
tion. Nevertheless, it also established that the law was only effective at the 2013 local
elections, implying that at the local elections of 2009 all incumbent mayors could still
4Law no. 49/2005 from August 29th 2005.
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Table 3.2: Mayor’s Number of Terms in office
Term 2001 2005 2009
1 88 66 74
2 75 75 54
3 52 56 62
4 26 34 34
5 16 20 24
6 8 13 12
7 8 5 9
8 5 4 3
9 5 4
10 2
Source: Own calculations, based
on data provided by the Por-
tuguese national elections com-
mission (CNE).
rerun. In other words, term limits were only first binding for incumbent mayors serving
their at least third consecutive term in the 2013 local elections - the first exogenously
determined open-seat elections for the municipal council in Portugal. In total, 150
mayors were in this situation out of the 278 mainland municipalities.
The timeline and design of the reform creates an interesting quasi-natural experi-
ment, as it is possible to rely on both between- and within-municipality variation to
identify the impact of mayoral term limits on political selection. Figure 3.1 shows the
spatial distribution of Portuguese mainland municipalities affected and non-affected by
the reform: municipalities that elected a lame duck in 2009 are represented in dark
gray.
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Figure 3.1: Spatial Distribution of Term Limited Municipalities
Source: Lopes da Fonseca (2019).
3.3.3 Portuguese Mayors Overview
This analysis focus on the 278 Portuguese municipalities and relies on an original and
extensive dataset on mayors’ personal characteristics at the past four local elections:
2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013 - a total of 260 individuals.5 The National Electoral Com-
mission’s (Comissa˜o Nacional de Eleic¸o˜es) and the General Directorate for Internal
Affairs’s (Direcc¸a˜o Geral da Administrac¸a˜o Interna) websites provide the data both on
electoral results – the number of votes and seats at the party level per municipality –
5Our dataset comprises data since the first local elections in 1976. However, in 2001 other electoral
reform took place, allowing independent lists to run. We focus then only on the subsequent elections
in order to abstract from potential selection bias effects.
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and some mayor’s characteristics – name, party, age, education, occupation and place
of birth. These personal characteristics are self-reported by the elected politicians after
taking office. However, it is rather incomplete and imprecise. Thus, we complemented
it manually using information found online or contacting directly the municipal council.
Taking all the available information, we compiled the following variables based on
mayors’ characteristics: a dummy if women; the age when they took office for the first
time; the level of education an index from 1 to 6 (1 being four years of schooling and
6 having a doctoral degree); the area of education, namely medicine, law, economics,
engineering, arts, etc.; and the occupation before taking office, namely lawyer, medical
doctor, school teacher, architect, etc.
Firstly, with respect to the number of women taking office between 2001 and 2013,
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2 describe the data and its distribution, respectively. We observe
that until 2013, on average, solely around 6% of local incumbents were women - around
17 out of the 278 municipalities each year - and this share has not change significantly
after the term limit reform.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics - Women in Office
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2001 278 0.054 0.226 0 1
2005 278 0.058 0.233 0 1
2009 278 0.076 0.265 0 1
2013 278 0.083 0.276 0 1
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Figure 3.2: Distribution - Women in Office
Before 2013 2013
Regarding the age local politicians take office for the first time, we were able to col-
lect this information for almost all elected mayors, with exception of three newcomers in
2013, and Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 summarize the data. Before the reform, incumbents
took office with approximately 44 years old. However, the mean and median age has
increased after the reform, as well as its minimum and maximum values, shifting the
distribution to the right.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics - Age at the First Term
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
2001 278 43.583 8.185 22 44 67
2005 278 43.896 8.272 22 44 72
2009 278 44.626 7.855 22 45 66
2013 275 47.294 8.264 28 47 70
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Figure 3.3: Distribution - Age at the First Term
Before 2013 2013
One important characteristic is the education level, the most commonly used in the
political selection literature as a measure of incumbent’s quality. We compiled this
information for the most part of Portuguese mayors and we constructed an index from
1 to 6: level 1 for four years of education (mandatory until 1966); level 2 for six years of
education (mandatory until 1986); level 3 for nine years of education (mandatory until
2009); level 4 for twelve years of education; level 5 for tertiary education, including a
bachelor degree, a master degree or an MBA; and level 6 for a doctoral degree. Table
3.5 and Figure 3.4 reports this information for the winning politicians at four local
electoral years. The majority of the incumbents have completed tertiary education and
the overall situation was maintained after the reform.
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics - Education Level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
2001 241 4.772 0.600 1 5 6
2005 249 4.791 0.613 1 5 6
2009 258 4.841 0.566 1 5 6
2013 264 4.882 0.570 1 5 6
Figure 3.4: Distribution - Education Level
Before 2013 2013
In addiction to the level education, we also collected information regarding the field
of education. This gives us further knowledge about the pool of politicians and their
“quality”, as some of the fields are more complex and given the lower vacancy rates
of some university degrees in Portugal, namely Law and Medicine. This data is not
publicly available and to the best of our knowledge we were the first to collect it, we
were able to find it for the majority of politicians. Figure 3.5 describes the distribution
of field of Education of mayors in office during 2001 and 2013. We can observe that main
areas of specialization are Law, Engineering and Economics, and the overall composition
has not change significantly after the term limits implementation.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution - Field of Education
Before 2013 2013
Finally, we also assemble details regarding mayors’ professional occupation before
taking office. For that, we contrasted the publicly available data - self-reported - with
the biographic information found online or provided by the city council. We organized
this data into fourteen categories as shown by Figure 3.6. The most prominent former
professions are executive positions (chief executives, administrators or directors of a
company), school teachers or technicians. The main striking difference after the reform
is the fact that significantly more officeholders had followed a career path related to
local politics before taking office, either they had already been deputies at the municipal
council for several years or were party officials.
Figure 3.6: Distribution - Previous Professional Occupation
Before 2013 2013
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Data
The empirical analysis relies on an extensive dataset at Portuguese municipal level over
four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. We aim to identify the causal impact of
biding term limits on political selection. For that purpose, we take our original dataset
described in the previous section and we construct nine outcome variables about mayors’
personal characteristics: a dummy indicating woman as local incumbent; the age when
they took office for the first time; a dummy indicating tertiary education, i.e. if the
incumbent has obtained an undergraduate or graduate degree, including a doctoral
degree; dummies identifying mayors’ fields of education - Law, Medicine or Engineering;
and dummies indicating the professional occupation before taking office - executive
positions, politician or retired. Panel A of Table 3.6 summarizes these variables, where
for each one we only include municipalities with available information over the four
electoral years. For robustness, we replicate the analysis including only municipalities
for which we have no missing data, i.e. comparing the same local incumbents in all
outcome variables.
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Women (0/1) 1112 0.067 0.251 0 1
Age (No.) 1100 44.926 8.240 22 72
Tertiary Education (0/1) 976 0.837 0.369 0 1
Medicine Degree (0/1) 808 0.058 0.234 0 1
Law Degree (0/1) 808 0.200 0.401 0 1
Engineering Degree (0/1) 808 0.207 0.405 0 1
Executive Positions (0/1) 1100 0.137 0.344 0 1
Politician (0/1) 1100 0.079 0.270 0 1
Retired (0/1) 1100 0.059 0.236 0 1
Panel B: Control Variables
Population (1,000) 1112 35.873 57.498 1.768 563.149
Young Population (%) 1112 14.019 2.606 5.086 22.548
Old Population (%) 1112 22.665 6.649 8.599 44.275
Unemployment Rate (%) 1112 7.037 2.812 1.517 18.295
Electricity Cons. per capita 1112 4120.5 4938.6 1114.3 79965.1
Candidates (No.) 1112 4.268 1.116 2 10
Turnout (%) 1112 63.568 8.480 37.77 82.35
Mayor Before (0/1) 1112 0.038 0.191 0 1
The analysis also includes a number of control variables, namely socioeconomic and
political characteristics and Panel B of Table 3.6 summarizes them. The socioeconomic
variables comprise measures of municipal population size, municipal unemployment, a
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measure for municipal economic activity proxied . Municipal population size coincides
with the resident population per municipality series from Statistics Portugal (INE),
and it is also included the share of this population aged below 15 years old together
with share of population aged more the than 65 years old. Municipal unemployment is
measured by the ratio of resident population aged between 15 and 65 years old who is
enrolled as unemployed in Portuguese Institute of Employment and Professional Train-
ing (IEFP). This latter series is obtained from the Database of Contemporary Portugal
(PORDATA). Lastly, the electricity consumption series is also publicly available at
Statistics Portugal and weighted then by resident population per municipality.
The set of municipality’s political characteristics is constructed based on data ob-
tained from SGMAI : number of candidates running for office, the turnout at the current
local election and a dummy indicating whether the incumbent politician had been in
office before, either in other municipality or if she had stepped down/lost a reelection
and came back.
3.4.2 Identification Strategy
The introduction of binding term limits implied exogenous variation in eligibility for
office, which in turn might create differences in composition of elected local politicians.
We test this hypothesis empirically, using a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences
approach. We use data of Portuguese municipalities over four local elections and we
focus on the impact in first wave of term-limited elections, in 2013. These were held in
municipalities which in 2009 re-elected incumbents to serve at least a third mandate,
so the 2009 local election results implicitly assign treatment. If treated and control
municipalities are comparable, it is possible to capture the variation in eligibility and
use it to identify the causal impact of term limits on political selection.
We estimate then differences in mayors’ characteristics both between treatment and
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control municipalities and from pre- to post-treatment period. Formally, let Ti be the
dummy that indicates treatment, equal to one if municipality i elected a lame duck
in 2009, and zero otherwise. Treatment assignment occurs at t0, which corresponds to
the 2009 local elections. The post-treatment period corresponds to the 2013 elections.
Accordingly, let dt be a dummy that switches to one in 2013. Inference on the average
treatment effect of term limits on mayors’ characteristics is based on the following
general differences-in-differences regression model:
Yit = λi + λt + δ(Ti · dt) +X ′itβ + it (3.1)
where Yit is any of the outcome variables, Dit = Ti ·dt indicates a binding term limit
and δ parameter measures the average treatment effect of term limits on the different
outcome variables. X ′it it is the vector of socioeconomic and political control variables
described in the next section. The model is fully identified by including municipality
and electoral year fixed effects, λi and λt. For robustness, in more conservative versions
of the baseline model, we add district trends, λd · t to control for district-specific trends,
and district-year fixed effects, λdt, to allow for variations in unobservable district-specific
variables over time.6
3.4.3 Results
Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 display the difference-in-difference results, where average treat-
ment effects from different regression models are presented in each cells. All estimations
include municipality and year fixed effects. The outcome variable and corresponding
number of observations are indicated in the first column. Model (1) corresponds to the
baseline estimation of of Equation (3.1). Models (2) and (3) include also district-specific
6Although districts are not an official local administrative unit, they have existed since 1835 and
cover similar municipalities.
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electoral year trends and district-electoral year fixed effects, respectively. In models (4),
(5) and (6) we replicate each of these three models, respectively, including the vector
of control variables described in Table 3.6. In general, for all outcome variables, the
magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates are consistent across all model,
suggesting their robustness to omitted variable bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005).
Firstly, Table 3.7 presents the estimation results for the more comprehensive mayors’
personal characteristics: a dummy indicating woman as local incumbent (Women), the
age when they took office for the first time (Age) and a dummy indicating tertiary
education (Tertiary Education), taking the value one if the incumbent has obtained
an undergraduate or graduate degree, including a doctoral degree. We obtained only
statistically significant results coefficients for Age and robust for all model specifications.
On average, in 2013, term-limited municipalities local elected older politicians with
approximately four more years old. In the contrary, the introduction term limits has
not a statistically significant impact in the share of elected women or mayors who had
completed tertiary education.
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Table 3.7: Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women -0.044 -0.046 -0.040 -0.052 -0.051 -0.047
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
Age 3.944*** 4.096*** 4.038*** 4.129*** 4.085*** 4.078***
(1.06) (1.04) (1.10) (1.07) (1.05) (1.10)
Obs. 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
Tertiary Education -0.065 -0.060 -0.068 -0.077 -0.066 -0.071
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Obs. 976 976 976 976 976 976
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
In turn, Table 3.8 shows the impact of term limits on the composition of the pool
of elected politicians. We observe statistically significant impact solely on the share of
mayors with a Law Degree, robust to all model specifications. On average, in 2013,
term-limited municipalities local elected less 12% of politicians with this degree than
the comparison group. However, no effect was found on the share of elected mayors
with a Medicine or Engineering Degrees.
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Table 3.8: Treatment Effects: Education Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicine Degree 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.006 -0.002 -0.004
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 808 808 808 808 808 808
Law Degree -0.101* -0.116** -0.123** -0.111* -0.120** -0.126**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 808 808 808 808 808 808
Engineering Degree -0.006 0.005 0.008 -0.009 -0.003 -0.000
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Obs. 808 808 808 808 808 808
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
Finally, Table 3.9 displays the differences-in-differences estimation results related
to the previous professional occupation of local incumbents. Interestingly, we find a
statistically significant impact only on the share of mayors with a previous political
career, which is robust to all model specifications. After the reform, in term-limited
municipalities local elected approximately 10% more incumbents connected to local
politics. No effect was found on the share of elected mayors retired or that occupied
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executive positions.
In summary, our baseline results suggest that before the implementation of term
limits, being a mayor in Portugal could be considered as a career path, which one
would stat at a young age and with no previous political experience.
Table 3.9: Treatment Effects: Previous Professional Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Positions -0.005 -0.006 -0.012 0.004 -0.006 -0.011
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
Politician 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.099** 0.101** 0.102** 0.096**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
Retired -0.036 -0.038 -0.027 -0.029 -0.035 -0.022
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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3.5 Internal Validity
3.5.1 Common Trends
The main identification assumption relies on the common trends condition (Meyer,
1995). For it to hold, in the absence of treatment the trend in each outcome variables
should be the same for all municipalities. The standard approach to test this assump-
tion consists in restricting the sample to the pre-treatment period and regressing the
dependent variables on yearly dummies indicating the treatment group (Moser and
Voena, 2012). This can be assessed by estimating the following model:
Yit = λi + λt +
q∑
j=1
δDi,t+j + it (3.2)
where the sum allows for q pre-treatment effects. The remaining variables are defined
as before. The estimation includes the electoral years: 2001, 2005 and 2009. The
baseline year is 2005, as it was electoral year before the law entered into force. For
compactness, Figure 3.7 shows the results from the estimation of Equation 3.2 for each
of the studied outcome variables in graph format. The y-axis indicates the outcome
variables and the x-axis the years. The horizontal line at zero represents the control
group.
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Figure 3.7: Year Effects Plots depict the coefficients estimates obtained from regressing Equation 3.2 on each
outcome variable during the pre-treatment local elections: 2001, 2005 and 2009. The baseline year is 2005. The y-axis
lists the outcome variables. The x-axis indicates the years. Capped lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals
In general, the plots show insignificant coefficient estimates for the pre-treatment
period, providing support for the common trends hypothesis. Robustness results with
control variables are presented in Appendix C.1.1.
3.5.2 Controlling for Anticipation Effects
Given the time-line of the reform, it is important to take to account possible antici-
pation effects that might be biasing the results. As previously described, the law that
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introduced mayoral term limits entered into force in the beginning of 2006 but it was
only binding in 2013, allowing all incumbent mayors one last chance at reelection in
the 2009 local elections. Therefore, this might have political selection effects already
at these elections, before term limits even became effective. It might distort incentives
for mayors to rerun in 2009 or might make a certain type of politician leave the local
political career.
In this section, we test for anticipation effects hypothesis in several ways. Firstly,
we reestimate baseline differences-in-differences model of Equation 3.1, excluding the
2009 local elections. Tables in Appendix C.1.2 present the results. All estimates are in
line with the baseline results, both in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients and its
significance, dismissing any possible concerns of anticipation effects bias.
Moreover, we extended the yearly effects model of 3.2 including the treatment year
as follows:
Yit = λi + λt +
q∑
j=1
δDi,t+j + δ2013Di,2013 + it (3.3)
where the sum allows for q pre-treatment effects and δ2013 gives the average treat-
ment effects. In first step, we estimate the model including the four electoral years:
2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. The baseline year is 2005, as before. In a second step, we
re-estimate Equation 3.3 but now excluding the electoral year of 2009. Figures C.2 and
C.3 in Appendix C display the respective results of each step in a graph format. Once
again, all estimates are in line with the baseline results. Once again, all estimates are
in line with the baseline results dismissing further concerns of anticipation effects bias.
Finally, we test for possible anticipation effects by restring the sample including
solely municipalities where incumbent decided to rerun in 2009. This allows us to
control for any possible distortionary impacts in rerunning incentives at these local
elections. In the local elections of 2009, 41 incumbents decided not to rerun and so we
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re-estimate the baseline model excluding these municipalities over the local elections of
2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. Tables C.4, C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C present the results.
All estimates are in line with the baseline results, both in terms of the magnitude of the
coefficients and its significance, dismissing any further concerns of anticipation effects
bias.
3.5.3 Selection Bias
A potential problem with DD estimations that should be taken into account relates
to issues of selection bias. A key identification assumption is that municipalities are
exogenously assigned to treatment. Solely when this holds, one can causally identify
the effect of the reform as the differential change in the outcome variables from pre- to
post-treatment period. If it is not the case causality is then undermined.7
One can test for selection bias in a number of ways. In fact, the evidence of existence
of common trends found in Figure 3.7 suggests treatment assignment to be exogenous.
This is validated even further by the fact the magnitude and significance of the baseline
coefficient estimates remain consistent, even after the introduction of a vector of control
variables.
Two common approaches to test for selection bias in the context of a DD framework
is to devise placebo and balance tests. These tests usually consist on reestimating the
baseline results relying on a placebo treatment setting it at a fake treatment year (de
Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw, 2011). Here, the sample is restricted to the pre-
treatment period, i.e. focusing only on the local elections of 2001 and 2005, and 2005
is considered as the treatment year. We exclude 2009 since, by then, the treatment
assignment had already occurred. As Tables C.7, C.8 and C.9 in Appendix C.1.3
7For a discussion on the importance of choosing careful comparison groups to evaluate place-based
policies see Neumark and Simpson (2015).
Catarina Alvarez 80
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
show the placebo test for the baseline results reestimating Equation 3.1. As before,
each cell provides the average treatment effect from a different regression, and the first
column indicates the corresponding outcome variable. All estimates are close to zero
and insignificant dismissing any concerns of a possible selection bias.
Moreover, balance tests offer an alternative mechanism to test whether treatment
and control municipalities differ on observable characteristics (Pei, Pischke, and Schwandt,
2017). Here, we regress socioeconomic and political variables on the dummy variable
Ti indicating treatment in order to identify fundamental differences between treatment
and control municipalities. We restrict the time frame only to 2001 so as to include
only the local elections before the law came into force. Table 3.10 displays the results.
Table 3.10: Balance Tests - 2001
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-value
Population (1,000) 9.485 6.916 0.171
Young Population (%) 0.081 0.305 0.790
Old Population (%) -0.528 0.815 0.518
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.063 0.289 0.829
Electricity Cons. per capita 109.485 526.349 0.835
Candidates (No.) 0.050 0.127 0.692
Turnout (%) -3.333 0.876 0.000
Mayor Before (0/1) -0.011 0.019 0.559
Note: Balance tests obtained from regressing each variable on the left on
a dummy indicating treatment in 2001. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.
Coefficient estimates show significant differences between treatment and control mu-
nicipalities for turnout. Treatment municipalities on average a lower turnout rate. All
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other variables suggest that the treatment and control municipalities are comparable.
Furthermore, an additional concern that might be creating a sort of selection bias is
the fact that there some missing information and for each outcome variable some munic-
ipalities have more data available than other for different outcome variables. Therefore,
in order to obtain a comparable dataset, we only include the municipalities that have
no missing data with respect to any dependent variable - 199 out of the 278 main-
land municipalities. We re-estimate the baseline model and Tables of Appendix C.1.4
present the results. All estimates in line with baseline results, dismissing any concerns
of a possible selection bias from missing information.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the political selection effects of introducing mayoral term limits
in Portugal. For that, we compiled an original dataset on personal characteristics of
Portuguese mayors at the past four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013 - a total
of 586 individuals from the 278 mainland municipalities. Our identification strategy
relies on a difference-in-differences approach estimating how these mayors’ personal
characteristics differ on average between municipalities with re-eligible and term-limited
incumbents.
The baseline results show that municipalities affected by the reform elected politi-
cians, on average, older (around four years) and with a past political career. The
results are robust to several falsification tests, in particular concerning any potential
anticipation effects at the 2009 local election. This might suggest that before the im-
plementation of term limits, being a mayor in Portugal could be considered as a career
path, which one would stat at a young age and with no previous political experience.
Nevertheless, in order to corroborate this idea we need explore further the implications
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of the reform, namely by looking at in detail at the type and number of years of political
experience. We are able to perform this analysis, since we have also data on all elected
councilmen.
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Conclusion
This thesis explores three reforms implemented in Portugal to obtain causal inference
about the manifold impacts of the rules that shape local government behavior. In the
first chapter, I study the political consequences of a mass reappraisal reform. For that,
I focus on the financial assistance program to Portugal in 2011, which put in place an
urgent wave of property reassessments in all municipalities, and the electoral response
at the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2015. I use an original database for all
278 mainland Portuguese municipalities three electoral years: 2009, 2011 and 2015.
The baseline results show that the intensity of reassessments had not a statistically
significant impact on any vote share outcome. This might be explained by the reduction
of salience of the reform due to tax cap policy that smoothed out the increment in tax
liabilities. Heterogeneous effects based on the real effect of the reassessment, in turn,
indicate that in municipalities where, on average, tax liabilities augmented more, voters
punished more the incumbent government party, the right-wing coalition.
In the second chapter, we want to determine whether property tax differentials on
real estates are capitalized. The scarce empirical evidence has reported mixed results.
The aftermath of a reform introducing a lower maximum tax rate for urban properties
is the perfect laboratory to study whether there is an effect on housing prices. We take
advantage of this reform to establish causality using a rich dataset on the universe of
mainland Portuguese municipalities. We believe that this strategy allows for credible
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inference upon the causal effects of this reform. Since the present paper studies the
impact of a nationwide policy, rather than a number of local jurisdictions, we also believe
that it presents a higher degree of external validity. We perform several robustness
checks and falsification tests to have a better view regarding possible mechanisms. Our
findings suggest that agents rationally incorporate the decreased cost of living in their
buying decisions, which are reflected in a market price increase with the net present
value of the tax reduction. Our results thus corroborate standard capitalization theory.
In our most conservative estimate, we observe an increase close to 5%.
Finally, in the third chapter, we analyze the political selection effects of introduc-
ing mayoral term limits in Portugal. For that, we compiled an original dataset on
personal characteristics of Portuguese mayors at the past four local elections: 2001,
2005, 2009 and 2013 - a total of 586 individuals from the 278 mainland municipalities.
Our identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach estimating how
these mayors’ personal characteristics differ on average between municipalities with re-
eligible and term-limited incumbents. The baseline results show that municipalities
affected by the reform elected politicians, on average, older (around four years) and
with a past political career. The results are robust to several falsification tests, in
particular concerning any potential anticipation effects at the 2009 local election. This
might suggest that before the implementation of term limits, being a mayor in Portugal
could be considered as a career path, which one would stat at a young age and with no
previous political experience. Nevertheless, in order to corroborate this idea we need
explore further the implications of the reform, namely by looking at in detail at the
type and number of years of political experience. We are able to perform this analysis,
since we have also data on all elected councilmen.
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A.2 Treatment Intensity - Distribution
Figure A.1: Intensity of Treatment - Histogram and Density
A.3 Tax Base Growth Rate - Distribution
Figure A.2: Property Tax Base Growth Rate - Histogram and Density
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B.1 Treated vs. Control Municipalities
Figure B.1: Treated vs. Control Municipalities
(a) Complete Sample (b) Restricted Sample
Note: Treated municipalities – forced to decrease the property tax rate in
2008 – in darker grey and control in lighter grew.
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B.2 Robustness I:
Different Clustered Standard Errors
NUTS III Level Clustering
Table B.1: Property Tax Reform Effects on Urban Real Estate Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full Sample
Tit 0.063 0.060 0.064 0.060 0.062
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Tit 0.066 0.064 0.068 0.062 0.065
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1491 1491 1491 1491 1491
Controls:
– Demographic X X X X
– Economic X X X
– Public Goods X X
– Political X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.1). The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the mean value of urban real estate transactions (in real terms). All
estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at NUTS III level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
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Regional Level Clustering
Table B.2: Property Tax Reform Effects on Urban Real Estate Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full Sample
Tit 0.063 0.060 0.064 0.060 0.062
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Tit 0.066 0.064 0.068 0.062 0.065
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Obs. 1491 1491 1491 1491 1491
Controls:
– Demographic X X X X
– Economic X X X
– Public Goods X X
– Political X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (2.1). The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the mean value of urban real estate transactions (in real terms). All
estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
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Figure C.1: Year Effects Plots depict the coefficients estimates obtained from regressing Equation 3.3 on
each mayors’ characteristic outcome variable during the four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. The y-axis lists
the outcome variables; The x-axis indicates the years. All estimates include municipality a vector of control variables.
Capped lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals
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C.1.2 Controlling for Anticipation Effects
Baseline Results: 2001, 2005 and 2013
Table C.1: Treatment Effects: 2001, 2005 and 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women -0.059 -0.059 -0.058 -0.066* -0.064* -0.065*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 834 834 834 834 834 834
Age 3.302*** 3.454*** 3.393*** 3.523*** 3.488*** 3.451***
(1.20) (1.18) (1.20) (1.20) (1.19) (1.21)
Obs. 825 825 825 825 825 825
Tertiary Education -0.102 -0.100 -0.101 -0.113* -0.107* -0.107*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 732 732 732 732 732 732
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.2: Education Area - 2001, 2005 and 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicine Degree 0.034 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.018
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 606 606 606 606 606 606
Law Degree -0.109* -0.131** -0.134** -0.116* -0.136** -0.137**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 606 606 606 606 606 606
Engineering Degree 0.008 0.021 0.028 0.009 0.019 0.027
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Obs. 606 606 606 606 606 606
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.3: Previous Professional Occupation - 2001, 2005 and 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Positions -0.024 -0.028 -0.030 -0.021 -0.036 -0.038
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 825 825 825 825 825 825
Politician 0.089** 0.083* 0.083* 0.081* 0.081* 0.081*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 825 825 825 825 825 825
Retired -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 825 825 825 825 825 825
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Year Effects: 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013
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Figure C.2: Year Effects Plots depict the coefficients estimates obtained from regressing Equation 3.3 on
each outcome variable during four local elections: 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. The baseline year is 2005. The y-axis lists
the outcome variables. The x-axis indicates the years. Capped lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals
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Year Effects: 2001, 2005 and 2013




































































Figure C.3: Year Effects Plots depict the coefficients estimates obtained from regressing Equation 3.3 on
each outcome variable during four local elections: 2001, 2005 and 2013. The baseline year is 2005. The y-axis lists the
outcome variables. The x-axis indicates the years. Capped lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals
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Without mayors that didn’t rerun in 2009
Table C.4: Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.014 -0.013 -0.003
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 948 948 948 948 948 948
Age 4.323*** 4.236*** 4.058*** 4.770*** 4.301*** 4.129***
(1.12) (1.11) (1.19) (1.11) (1.08) (1.15)
Obs. 936 936 936 936 936 936
Tertiary Education -0.028 -0.019 -0.031 -0.036 -0.024 -0.033
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Obs. 840 840 840 840 840 840
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.5: Treatment Effects: Education Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicine Degree 0.022 0.015 0.012 0.021 0.009 0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 696 696 696 696 696 696
Law Degree -0.085 -0.117* -0.135** -0.099 -0.123** -0.138**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Obs. 696 696 696 696 696 696
Engineering Degree -0.064 -0.054 -0.060 -0.060 -0.047 -0.052
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Obs. 696 696 696 696 696 696
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.6: Treatment Effects: Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Positions 0.015 0.033 0.030 0.022 0.033 0.032
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 936 936 936 936 936 936
Politician 0.109** 0.104** 0.100** 0.105** 0.099** 0.095**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Obs. 936 936 936 936 936 936
Retired -0.061* -0.071** -0.061* -0.053 -0.061* -0.052
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 936 936 936 936 936 936
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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C.1.3 Selection Bias
Placebo Tests
Table C.7: Placebo Test: 2001 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women -0.008 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Tertiary Education -0.055 -0.053 -0.053 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 488 488 488 488 488 488
Age -0.680 -0.455 -0.455 -0.725 -0.604 -0.604
(0.62) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62)
Obs. 550 550 550 550 550 550
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
Catarina Alvarez 115
Reforming Local Governance: Fiscal Federalism and Political Accountability
Table C.8: Placebo Test: Education Area - 2001 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicine Degree 0.024 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Obs. 404 404 404 404 404 404
Law Degree 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.024 0.024
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 404 404 404 404 404 404
Engineering Degree -0.036 -0.056 -0.056 -0.035 -0.057 -0.057
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 404 404 404 404 404 404
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
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Table C.9: Placebo Test: Occupation - 2001 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Positions -0.039 -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.038 -0.038
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Obs. 550 550 550 550 550 550
Politician -0.016 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.023 -0.023
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 550 550 550 550 550 550
Retired 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.038 0.039 0.039
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 550 550 550 550 550 550
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panel B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance, respectively.
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C.1.4 Controlling for Missing Information
Table C.10: Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women -0.065 -0.064 -0.055 -0.073* -0.067 -0.055
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Age 4.474*** 4.861*** 4.815*** 4.390*** 4.698*** 4.703***
(1.19) (1.16) (1.23) (1.18) (1.19) (1.26)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Tertiary Education -0.101* -0.102* -0.110* -0.106* -0.103* -0.108*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.11: Treatment Effects: Education Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicine Degree 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.006
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Law Degree -0.112* -0.125** -0.132** -0.121** -0.129** -0.135**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Engineering Degree 0.002 0.012 0.016 -0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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Table C.12: Treatment Effects: Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Positions -0.023 -0.017 -0.013 -0.018 -0.020 -0.015
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Politician 0.107** 0.095* 0.088 0.093* 0.085* 0.078
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
Retired -0.043 -0.036 -0.028 -0.043 -0.037 -0.028
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Obs. 796 796 796 796 796 796
District trends X X
District x year FE X X
Controls X X X
Note: Results are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3.1). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects. Refer to panels B of Table 3.6 for the list of control variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at municipal level are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance, respectively.
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